地方政府持股与城市商业银行经营绩效

Local Government Shareholding and Business Performance of City Commercial Banks

以2010—2020年111家城市商业银行为研究样本,利用固定效应面板数据模型实证研究政府持股对城市商业银行经营绩效的影响。研究显示:政府持股比例越高,城市商业银行的绩效越差;地方财政压力与政府持股比例之间存在正相关关系,地方财政压力越大则政府持股比例越高;政府持股比例与城市商业银行不良贷款率呈现“U”型关系,当政府持股比例达到最优时(约33%),城市商业银行不良贷款率最低。政府持股在监管更为严格的上市城市商业银行中的影响不显著,对非上市城市商业银行的净资产收益率影响显著为负。为此,优化城市商业银行的股权结构、加强监管力度、促进政府以更加市场化的方式参与银行经营,既有助于城市商业银行发挥服务国家发展目标和实体经济、有效防控金融风险的作用,也有助于城市商业银行保持一定的经营效益,实现高质量发展。

This paper takes 111 City Commercial Banks(CCB)from 2010 to 2020 as research samples,and uses a fixed effect panel data model to empirically study the impact of government shareholding on the business performance of CCB.The results show that:the higher the government shareholding ratio,the worse the performance of CCB;there is a positive correlation between the local fiscal pressure and the government shareholding ratio;the greater the local fiscal pressure,the higher the government shareholding ratio;the government shareholding ratio and the non-performing loan ratio of CCB present a"U"-shaped relationship,and when the government shareholding ratio reaches its optimal level(about 33%),the non-performing loan ratio of CCB is the lowest.Government shareholding has no significant impact on the return on equity of listed CCB with stricter supervision,but it is significantly negative for non-listed CCB.It is important to optimize the equity structure and strengthen the supervision of CCB,and promote government participation in the operation of CCB in a more market-oriented way,which can not only enable CCB to play the role of serving national development goals and the real economy,effectively preventing and controlling financial risks,but also enable CCB to maintain certain operating benefits and achieve high-quality development.