高管团队薪酬差距、投资效率与企业全要素生产率

Top Management Team Pay Gap,Efficient Investment and Firm Total Factor Productivity

基于社会比较理论与委托代理理论,从投资效率角度切入,研究高管团队水平薪酬差距对企业全要素生产率的影响及传导机制。研究发现:高管团队水平薪酬差距的拉大,会导致全要素生产率降低。作用机制表明,非效率投资在两者间发挥中介作用。进一步区分投资不足与投资过度后发现,高管团队水平薪酬差距主要通过投资过度路径对企业全要素生产率产生负面影响。企业异质性发现,在较大规模董事会的企业和非国有企业中,高管团队水平薪酬差距对全要素生产率的负面影响更为严重。研究结论为改善企业治理结构提供了相关经验证据。

Based on the social comparison theory and the principal-agent theory,this paper studies the influence and transmission mechanism of executive team level pay gap on total factor productivity of enterprises from the perspective of investment efficiency.The research finds that the widening of the salary gap at the executive team level will lead to the decrease of total factor productivity.The mechanism of action shows that inefficient investment plays an intermediary role between them.After further differentiating between under-investment and over-investment,it is found that the executive team level pay gap has a negative impact on the total factor productivity of enterprises mainly through the path of over-investment.According to firm heterogeneity,in enterprises with large board size and non-state-owned enterprises,the executive team level pay gap has a more serious negative impact on total factor productivity.This paper provides relevant empirical evidence for improving corporate governance structure.