摘要
基于流域氮素流通效率提升,探讨地方政府与农户的生态补偿策略选择,构建有限理性地方政府与农户的演化博弈模型,仿真分析演化均衡策略,提出补偿力度随农户行为变化的动态生态补偿政策,有利于政府长期优化政策和响应需求。研究表明:静态生态补偿政策下系统存在均衡稳定策略,且双方的初始合作比例直接影响系统演化速率;动态政策下演化轨迹螺旋式趋近混合策略焦点,可通过控制生态补偿上限等因素提升合作概率。
Based on the enhancement of nitrogen circulation efficiency in the watersheds,this paper explores ecological compensation strategy choices of decision-makers,constructs an evolutionary game model of boundedly rational local governments and farmers,and simulates the evolutionary equilibrium strategies.A dynamic ecological compensation policy is proposed,where compensation intensity changes with farmers'behavior,which is conducive to the government's long-term optimization of its policies.The study shows that there exists an equilibrium stability strategy for the system under static ecological compensation policy,meanwhile,the initial cooperation ratio of both parties directly affects the evolutionary rate of the system;the evolutionary trajectory under dynamic policy spirals towards a mixed strategy focus,and the cooperation ratio can be elevated by controlling the ecological compensation ceiling and other crucial factors.
作者
张骥骧
陈晓竹
ZHANG Jixiang;CHEN Xiaozhu(College of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing 211106,China)
出处
《复杂系统与复杂性科学》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2023年第2期90-97,共8页
Complex Systems and Complexity Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(71101071)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(NS2019045)。
关键词
氮素流通效率
演化博弈
生态补偿
演化稳定策略
nitrogen cascade efficiency
evolutionary game
ecological compensation
evolutionary stabilization strategy