碳配额交易下考虑消费者低碳偏好的供应链定价与协调

Supply chain pricing and coordination considering consumers'low-carbon preferences under carbon quota trading

在碳配额交易机制下,利用博弈论相关知识构建制造商、零售商和消费者组成的斯塔克尔伯格博弈模型。探讨了分散和集中决策下的碳减排率、销售价格和供应链利润与消费者低碳偏好的关系,并通过契约来协调供应链。研究发现:两种决策下消费者低碳偏好能促进碳减排率和供应链成员利润的上升,并且集中决策下的效果要优于分散决策下;而协调决策中,当分担比例0.55<μ<0.60,供应链可以达到有效协调;碳交易价格的提高会降低碳减排率,因此制定合理的碳交易价格和碳配额度能够促进企业碳减排生产。

Under the carbon quota trading mechanism,the Starkelberg game model consisting of manufacturers,retailers and consumers is constructed by using the knowledge of the game theory.The relationship between carbon reduction rate,sales price and supply chain profit and consumer low-carbon preference under decentralized and centralized decision making is explored,and the supply chain is coordinated by contract.The results show that consumers'low-carbon preference can promote the carbon emission reduction rate and supply chain members'profits under both decisions,and the effect under centralized decision is better than that under decentralized decision.In coordination decision,the supply chain can achieve effective coordination when the sharing ratio is 0.55<μ<0.60.The increase of carbon trading price will reduce the carbon emission reduction rate,so formulating reasonable carbon trading price and carbon quota can promote the carbon emission reduction production of enterprises.