国家治理视角下的中央地方财政博弈——典型特征与治理方略

Central⁃Local Fiscal Games Under State Governance:Typical Characteristics and Governance Strategis

本文通过归纳分税制改革以来在财政激励、经济增长和社会发展中体现出来的中央地方财政博弈的典型特征,发现分税制改革确立的以共享税分成为主体的税收分成制度已经成为中央地方财政博弈的现实基础。中央地方财政博弈行为的典型特征为:中央财政收入稳定增长的代价是拉大地方初始财力差距,中央财政收入法治化的代价是扩张地方和全国非税收入,中央财政支出公共化与地方财政支出的生产建设偏向形成鲜明对比,旨在缩小地方财力差距的转移支付导致项目膨胀和财政分配规则弱化。中央地方财政博弈的典型特征说明中国的中央地方财政关系因为内嵌了地方政府与市场的关系而体现出特殊性,借助政商关系、行政层级制和社会组织的准政府体制,地方政府扩展了资源配置能力,也因为严格的政治秩序排斥纵向博弈,助长了地方政府的非正规博弈行为。1994年《中华人民共和国预算法》实施前后的预算报告名称变化,体现出国家治理视角下中央地方财政关系的复杂性。推进中央地方财政博弈治理,意味着未来的政府间纵向关系构建不仅要完善财政分配关系,更要在党的集中统一领导下完善制度设计、规制政府行为、减少共同事权,建立中央地方零和博弈空间,从而形成“纵向互补、横向竞争”的良性财政发展格局。

The particular feature of China􀆳s central⁃local fiscal relationships can be manifested as a combination of economic decentralization and political centralization,which leads to both a competitive relationship based on market foundations and a vertical order based on political hierarchy.Intergovernmental fiscal relationships reflect China􀆳s unique complexity due to the government⁃market boundaries.Based on basic facts and institutional foundations of the central⁃local fiscal relationships,this article summarizes typical characteristics of the central⁃local fiscal relationships performed in government fiscal incentives,economic growth,and social development since the 1994 tax sharing reform,analyzes national functions and roles required for central⁃local fiscal relationships governance,and proposes basic strategies of the reform of central⁃local fiscal relationships.Findings of this paper are as follows:(1)The current tax sharing system based on the sharing of main taxes established by the 1994 tax sharing reform now works as the basic framework of local⁃central fiscal competition under the clear development orientation of the central and local governments.(2)Compared with regular and lawful government systems of the developed countries,the politics⁃commerce relationships,the administrative hierarchy,and the quasi⁃government systems of social organizations greatly expand the resource allocation capacity of the Chinese government.They also encourage informal competitive behaviors of local governments under strict political orders.(3)The fiscal goals of the central government are prone to distorting local government behavior:the stable growth of the central fiscal revenue enlarges initial financial gap between local governments;legalizing central fiscal revenue expands the non⁃tax revenue between local and national governments;and the people􀆳s livelihood expenditure bias of the central government fiscal expenditure contradicts to production and construction bias of local governments;the intergovernmental transfer payments system aimed at narrowing the local fiscal gaps expands the projects and weakens fiscal allocation rules.(4)The changes in the narratives of government budget reports before and after the 1994 Budget Law of the People􀆳s Republic of China reflects the complexity of the relationships among the central,local,state,and national fiscal entities,and also shows the paralleling of central and local fiscal powers under the unitary fiscal system,which is in contrast to the vertical political order.Under the centralized and unified leadership of the CPC,this paper concludes that to promote the state governance of central⁃local fiscal relationships,it is necessary to consolidate a third⁃party function of the National People􀆳s Congress,improve the design of the Constitution and legal system,regulate government behavior,control the social costs of policies,cut joint responsibilities of the central and local governments,and establish a“zero⁃competitive space”between the central government and the local governments,so as to form a benign intergovernmental fiscal development of“vertical complementarity and horizontal competitiveness”.