公众参与视角下的中央-地方-企业环境规制演化博弈分析

Game Analysis of Central-local-enterprise Environmental Regulation Evolution from the Perspective of Public Participation

中国环境治理体系的相关主体主要为中央政府、地方政府和企业,随着公众参与意识的日益增强,参与环境治理的程度也在不断提高。本文首先构建了中央政府-地方政府-企业三方环境规制演化博弈模型,在此基础上引入公众参与相关参数,运用仿真分析比较公众参与对原复制动力系统相关主体策略选择的影响。研究表明:引入相关参数可以更快实现系统均衡;针对公众实施的环保政策效果要优于针对地方政府和企业实施的环保政策效果;公众举报奖励与系统稳态存在倒“U”型关系。公众参与是改善治污效果的重要途径,对于提高地方政府积极执行环境规制、约束企业非法排污以及实现经济发展的同时保护生态环境具有重要作用。

In China,the relevant subjects of the environmental governance system are mainly the central government,local governments and enterprises.In recent years,with the continuous progress of industrialization,the problem of environmental pollution has become increasingly serious.Pollution incidents in some areas have occurred repeatedly,especially haze,water pollution and other problems,which have aroused public concern and participation in the environmental crisis.The increasing awareness of public participation has led to the continuous improvement of the degree of public participation in environmental governance,which leads to the question of whether public participation will affect the strategic choices of the relevant subjects of environmental governance,and if so,what is the extent of its impact? The comparative analysis of public participation in the basic tripartite evolutionary game model of environmental regulation in the form of parameters can answer this question clearly and intuitively,and at the same time,it has important practical significance on how to stably play the role of public participation in environmental governance,control the uncertainty of public participation as much as possible,and then optimize the environmental governance strategies of relevant subjects and improve the efficiency of environmental governance.First of all,taking the mainstream forces in the environmental governance system—the central government,local governments and enterprises as the main body,this paper constructs a basic framework of a tripartite evolutionary game model,and explores how the three parties choose environmental regulation strategies without considering public factors.Then,on the basis of the above model,the relevant parameters of public participation are introduced to construct a central-local-enterprise tripartite evolutionary game model under public participation to investigate the influence mechanism of public participation on environmental governance.Finally,drawing lessons from the parameter setting methods in the existing literature,in the case of changing the relevant parameters of public participation,MATLAB simulation is carried out to simulate the evolution path of each subject strategy choice in the system,so as to explore more intuitively the influence of public participation on the choice of tripartite subject strategy of central land and enterprises.It is found that:(1)Public participation has an inhibitory effect on illegal pollution discharge by enterprises and,to a certain extent,plays a substitute role in the implementation of environmental regulation by local governments;Public participation plays a positive role in promoting the active implementation of environmental regulation by local governments,and to a certain extent,it plays a substitute role in the supervision of the central government.The increase of public reporting incentives will promote the probability and speed of evolution of local governments to active implementation,improve the probability of evolution of the central government to non-strict supervision,and reduce the probability and speed of enterprises' evolution to illegal pollutant discharge;The improvement of enterprise energy saving and emission reduction technology plays a positive and positive role in promoting both enterprises and local governments.(2)The effect of the environmental protection policy implemented for the public is better than that for the local government and enterprises,and the direct reporting reward to the public can accelerate the stability of the system.This promoting effect is more obvious than that produced by the implementation of environmental protection policies for local governments and enterprises.(3)There is an inverted “U” relationship between the public reporting reward and the steady state of the system:When the public reporting reward level does not exceed the inflection point,increasing the public reporting reward level will help to achieve the stability of the system,but when the public reporting reward level exceeds the inflection point,if we further improve the public reporting reward,its role will gradually shift from promotion to suppression,which will hinder the stability of the system.On the one hand,the central government needs to strengthen the incentive and restraint on the behavior of local governments by the combination of evaluation incentive and reputation punishment mechanism,so as to improve the enthusiasm of enterprises to reduce emissions,and on the other hand,it should establish and improve the system of public participation in environmental protection,encourage the public to actively participate in the governance of the ecological environment,and require the public to exercise their corresponding rights in accordance with the law on the basis of meeting a certain incentive intensity,in order to avoid disorderly and ineffective participation caused by too many people participating in environmental governance in reality.