多方博弈参与下海绵城市PPP项目监管仿真研究

Simulation Research on Supervision of Sponge City PPP Projects under Multiparty Game Participation

海绵城市概念近年来逐渐被中国各大城市引入,并通过PPP模式结合社会资本以促进诸多基础设施建设,然而这在实际建设中容易出现信息不对称问题。针对这一问题,引入第三方社会公众,运用演化博弈研究公众参与下海绵城市PPP项目建设的信息不对称问题。研究发现,海绵城市PPP项目的企业行为决策同时受到政府监管和公众监督的影响,接着结合Matlab软件进行数值仿真后发现,政府监管与公众监督落实到位会大大减少企业投机行为,二者存在此消彼长关系,为海绵城市PPP项目建设提供理论依据和实践参考。

The concept of sponge city has been gradually introduced by major cities in China in recent years.It has been combined with social capital through the PPP model to promote the construction of many infrastructures,but this is prone to information asymmetry in actual construction.In response to this problem,the third-party public is introduced,and the evolutionary game is used to study the information asymmetry in the construction of sponge city PPP projects under public participation.The study found that the corporate behavioral decisions of Sponge City PPP projects are simultaneously affected by the strategies of government supervision and public supervision.Combined with Matlab software to carry out numerical simulation,it is found that the implementation of government supervision and public supervision will greatly reduce corporate speculation.There is a trade-off relationship between the two,which provides a theoretical basis and practical reference for the construction of sponge city PPP projects.