监管强度预期与上市公司盈余管理——基于证监会随机抽查威慑作用的研究

Regulation Intensity and Earnings Management of Listed Firms——A research on the deterrent effect of the random spot check program by CSRC

有效的监管措施有助于提升信息披露质量,而监管政策的威慑效果一直是学界和业界关心的重要问题之一。本文通过手动获取2016-2020年间证监会上市公司现场检查“双随机”抽查的相关数据,以企业预期抽查概率作为监管强度预期的度量,实证分析了“双随机”抽查制度对于上市公司盈余管理行为的威慑作用。研究发现:现场“双随机”抽查机制对上市公司应计盈余管理具有威慑作用,监管强度预期越高的企业,盈余管理行为越弱;企业所在地区市场化水平、法治化水平、企业产权性质以及公司治理水平能够强化这一威慑作用的影响;企业审计费用与监管强度预期呈负相关关系,而对被抽中进行现场检查的企业,审计师会要求更高的审计费用。上述研究结果为评估证监会上市公司现场检查“双随机”制度的效果及其影响提供一定的实证证据。

Effective regulation can help improve the quality of information disclosure,and the deterrent effect of regulation has always been one of the important concerns for academics and practitioners.This paper empirically analyzes the deterrent effect of the“double random”spot checks of listed firms by the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC)on the earnings management behavior of listed firms using manually-collected data of such“double random”spot checks from 2016 to 2020.We use the expected probability of spot checks as the perceived regulation intensity.This paper finds that first,the“double random”spot check mechanism has a significant deterrent effect on the accrual earnings management of listed companies.The higher the perceived regulation intensity,the weaker the earnings management behavior.Second,this deterrent effect is affected by the marketoriented and law-based environment in the region,the nature of ownership and.corporate governance.Third,corporate audit fees are negatively related to perceived regulation intensity,while auditors will require higher audit fees for firms selected for spot checks.The paper provides empirical evidence for evaluating the effect and impact of the“double random”spot check mechanism of listed firms by the CSRC.