内部控制“多言寡行”是否会影响审计风险识别?

Will Cheap Talk on Internal Control Affect Auditors'Risk Identification?

在我国经济发展目标转为高质量发展的时代背景下,审计师对能否对内部控制信息披露的操纵行为进行识别,进而防范市场风险,为高质量发展保驾护航?本文从“言”和“行”两个角度评价企业的内部控制,并探究其对审计风险识别的影响。研究发现,企业在内部控制方面的“多言寡行”会降低审计师的风险识别水平;且这一效应仅在审计师轮换后的首年存在,在连续审计的第二年起便失去效力;“多言寡行”对审计风险识别的影响在证监会整治内部控制信息披露后得到抑制。进一步研究表明,“多言”与“寡行”均对审计风险识别有显著的负面作用,审计师工作压力较大时“多言寡行”对审计风险识别的影响更为显著。本文的研究对监管机构和审计师的风险识别具有一定现实意义。

In recent years,China's economic growth goal has transformed into high-quality development.In this context,the auditor's identification of manipulation of internal control information disclosure is of great significance for preventing market risks and maintaining high-quality development.This paper evaluates the internal control from the perspectives of“Words”and“Deeds”,and examines whether the“cheap talk”on internal control affects the auditors'risk identification.We find that cheap talk has caused significant negative impact on risk identification,especially in first-time audits after auditor switch.The effect was suppressed after the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC)rectified the exaggerated disclosure of internal control information.Further analysis shows that both“talk more”and“act less”have significant negative effects on risk identification,and when the auditors are under greater work pressure,cheap talk has a more significant impact on risk identification.Our research is of realistic significance for the risk identification of regulators and auditors.