东北亚权力结构演变和中国的战略选择——基于21世纪第三个十年的预测分析

Northeast Asia's Shifting Power Structure and China's Strategic Choices:Predictive Analysis for the 2030s

展望2030年,东北亚将延续21世纪第一个十年以来的美国“单极弱化”态势、并向“两个世界大国(中美)和三个地区大国(俄日韩)并存”的权力结构演变。中美战略竞争是这一权力结构的核心特征,乌克兰危机对东北亚权力结构演变的影响有限且总体可控。在向“两个世界大国和三个地区大国并存”权力结构演变的背景下,处于权力结构第二层级的俄日韩在东北亚采取地区大国外交和谋求地区性利益;整体国力较弱的朝鲜与蒙古处于第三层级,它们在东北亚的主要目标是确保生存和安全。中国的东北亚战略选择预期将包括:努力避免出现“新冷战”并实现中美在东北亚地区的战略平衡、与俄罗斯保持友好而密切的全面战略协作伙伴关系、积极推动与东北亚各国的经济合作、推动构建包括所有东北亚国家在内的地区安全机制和推动构建东北亚集体身份认同。

The Northeast Asian power structure demonstrates a weakening unipolarity of the U.S., which in the 2030s will evolve into a power structure with “multilateral co-opetition of two major powers(China and the U.S.) and three regional powers(Russia, Japan, and South Korea)”. Strategic competition between China and the U.S. is the main feature of the shifting power structure in Northeast Asia, while the Russia-Ukraine conflict has limited influence on the shifting power structure. In the context of this shifting power structure, Japan, Russia, and ROK, which occupy the second tier of the Northeast Asian power structure, will pursue regional power diplomacy and regional interests. The DPRK and Mongolia, whose national power is relatively weak, occupy the third tier of the Northeast Asian power structure, and will seek to ensure the survival of their respective regimes and promote national security. China's strategic choices for Northeast Asia in the next decade are likely to include five aspects: First, to avoid a “new Cold War” and achieve a strategic balance with the U.S.;Second, to maintain friendly and close strategic ties with Russia;Third, to actively promote economic cooperation with the other Northeast Asian countries;Fourth, to promote the establishment of a regional security mechanism in the future that includes all the Northeast Asian states;and Fifth, to construct a collective NEA identity.