国有企业党组织治理与企业债务违约

The Governance of the Party Organization and the Debt Default of State Owned Enterprises

近年来,我国企业债务违约数量和规模呈迅速上升趋势。党组织治理作为我国国有企业最具特色的治理机制是否有助于降低企业债务违约风险呢?本文选择2007—2020年沪深A股国有上市企业的13513个样本,研究国有企业党组织治理对于企业债务违约概率的影响,实证结果表明:第一,党组织治理可以显著降低国有企业债务违约概率。第二,机制上,党组织治理通过缓解管理层的谋私行为和抑制控股股东利益攫取行为的路径,降低了企业债务违约风险。第三,进一步分析表明,当企业代理问题越严重、债务水平越高、企业业绩越差或者国企级别较低时,党组织治理降低国有企业债务违约风险的效果会越显著。第四,经济效果上,债务违约使得企业价值显著降低,而党组织治理可以在一定程度上缓解债务违约对企业价值的负面作用。

In recent years,the number and the scale of debt default of Chinese enterprises are rising rapidly.As the most characteristic governance mechanism of state-owned enterprises,does Party organization governance help to reduce the risk of debt default?To be verified,this paper selects 13,513 samples of A-share state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2018 to study the influence of Party Organization Governance of stateowned enterprises on corporate debt default.The empirical results show that:Firstly,in state-owned enterprises,the party organization governance can significantly reduce the probability of enterprise debt default.Secondly,in terms of mechanism,the party organization governance reduces the risk of corporate debt default by alleviating the private behavior of the management and effectively restraining the profit grabbing behavior of the controlling shareholders.Thirdly,further analysis shows that when the agency problem of state-owned enterprises is relatively serious,the debt level is relatively high,the enterprise performance is relatively low or the State-owned enterprises are at a lower level,the effect of Party Organization Governance on reducing the risk of enterprise debt default will be more significant.Fourthly,in terms of economic consequences,corporate debt default wll significantly reduce the value of the enterprise,and party organization governance can alleviate the negative effect of debt default on enterprise value to a certain extent.