市场监督下债转股监管的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary game analysis of government regulationbased on market supervision in debt-to-equity swap

市场化债转股启动后,“明股实债”问题引起社会广泛关注.为探讨其监管问题,在考虑市场监督的基础上建立银行和企业所组成的利益共同体与政府间的演化博弈模型,分析其中一方策略不变时另一方策略的演化稳定性,以及双方策略同时演化时均衡点的稳定性.研究表明:1)仅单方策略演化时,政府在一定条件下可通过加强监管促使银企演化至实施真正的债转股,而银企总是可以通过积极实施真正的债转股使政府演化至不监管;2)当双方策略同时演化时,演化结果取决于政府和市场监督力量对银企声誉的影响以及市场监督力量的大小,若影响较大则市场监督力量可以对政府监管起到补充和替代作用,但若政府采取宽松的监管措施,演化结果还取决于双方初始策略.

The phenomenon of ostensible debt-to-equity swap has raised widespread concerns since the marketoriented debt-to-equity swap was launched.To study the regulatory issues of the phenomenon,an evolutionary game model between the bank-enterprise community of shared interests and the government has been established based on market supervision.The stability of one party's evolutionary strategies has been analyzed as the other party fixes its strategies.For the situation that both parties’strategies evolve,the stability of equilibrium points has been analyzed.The results show two conclusions:(1)When only one party's strategy evolves,it is possible for the government to impel the bank-enterprise community to carry out authentic debt-to-equity swap eventually by stronger regulation under certain conditions,and the bank-enterprise community can always make the government not to regulate their behaviors eventually by carrying out authentic debt-to-equity swap actively.(2)When both parties’strategies evolve,the evolutionary result is determined by the influence of the government and market supervision on the reputation of the bank-enterprise community,and the level of market supervision.If the influence is significant,the market supervision can complement and replace the government regulation to some extent.When loose regulation measures are adopted by the government,the evolutionary result is also determined by both parties’initial strategies.