协同视角下体育社会组织多元监管的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Supervision of Sports Social Organizations from a Collaborative Perspective

优化体育社会组织监管是体育创新和完善国家体育治理体系的重要内容。通过引入公众参与监管程度、声誉机制、奖惩机制等变量,构建了体育社会组织、第三方评估机构和政府的三方演化博弈模型,分析监管行为博弈主体间的稳定策略组合。研究表明:当公众参与监管参与率较高时,无论政府选择何种监管策略,体育社会组织都倾向于选择合规行为,第三方评估机构则倾向于严格评估;当社会公众参与监管程度较低时,三方主体会根据负面行为的风险与收益做出判断。当风险大于收益时,三方主体稳定于“合规行为、严格评估、宽松监管”策略,反之则稳定于“违规行为、消极评估、宽松监管”策略。基于此,提出搭建社会公众监管平台、优化奖惩体系、完善声誉机制等政策建议。

Optimizing the supervision of sports social organizations is an important part of the sports innovation and improvement of the national sports governance system.A tripartite evolutionary game model for sports social organizations,third-party evaluation agencies,and governments was built through introducing variables such as public participation in regulation,reputation mechanisms,and reward and punishment mechanisms so as to analyze the stable strategy combinations among game entities involved in regulatory behavior.It was shown that when the participation rate of public participation in regulation was high,regardless of the regulatory strategy chosen by the government,sports social organizations tended to choose compliant behavior,while third-party evaluation agencies tended to evaluate strictly.When the level of public participation in regulation was low,the three parties would make judgments based on the risks and benefits of the negative behavior.When the risks exceeded the benefits,the three parties would stabilize in the“compliant behavior,strict evaluation,and loose regulation”strategy.Or else,they would stabilize in the“violation behavior,negative evaluation,and loose regulation”strategy.Therefore,building a social public supervision platform,optimizing the reward and punishment system and improving reputation mechanisms were effective measures.