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区域碳减排合作的微分博弈与多情景模拟研究

Differential game and multi-scenario simulation of regional carbon emission reduction cooperation
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摘要 基于多元利益主体视角,建立由碳盈余政府、碳赤字政府和碳排放企业组成的区域碳减排动态微分博弈模型,探究多元利益主体的策略均衡解,比较分析有成本分担和无成本分担两种决策背景下多元利益主体策略选择、努力水平和社会福利的变化情况,构建了系统动力学模型进行多情景模拟仿真.结果表明:(1)成本分担政策下各利益主体的减排努力水平、收益水平、社会福利水平均有提升;(2)多元利益主体的减排策略选择之间会产生交互影响,受到各主体成本收益关系的影响;并且合作收益的变化还受到购买比例和奖励比例的影响;(3)边际收益的增加将提升减排积极性,减排效率衰减系数和减排成本与努力水平负相关;(4)社会福利、边际收益和碳减排量对碳赤字政府和碳排放企业的努力水平有较大影响;(5)碳赤字政府碳排放购买比例对碳盈余政府减排努力水平影响较大;(6)碳赤字政府减排奖励比例、企业社会声誉和区域碳减排外部性影响对碳排放企业减排努力水平有重要影响. Based on the perspective of multi-stakeholders,a dynamic differential game model of regional carbon emission reduction composed of carbon surplus government,carbon deficit government,and carbon emission enterprises was established,and the strategic equilibrium solution of multi-stakeholders was explored.In addition,the changes in multiple stakeholders'strategic choices,effort level,and social welfare under the two decision-making backgrounds of cost-sharing and no cost-sharing were compared and analyzed.On the basis of the above,a system dynamics model for multi-scenario simulation was constructed.The results show that:(1)Under the cost-sharing policy,the emission reduction efforts,benefits,and social welfare levels of all stakeholders have been improved.(2)The choice of emission reduction strategies of multiple stakeholders has an interactive impact,which is affected by the cost-benefit relationship of each stakeholder,and the change of cooperation income is also affected by the purchase proportion and reward proportion.(3)The increase in marginal income enhances the enthusiasm for emission reduction,and the attenuation coefficient of emission reduction benefits,emission reduction costs are negatively related to the level of effort.(4)Social welfare effect,marginal income,and carbon emission reduction have a great impact on the efforts of carbon deficit governments and carbon emission enterprises.(5)Carbon deficit government's carbon emission purchase proportion has a great impact on the carbon surplus government's emission reduction efforts.(6)Carbon deficit government incentives for emission reduction,corporate social reputation,and the external impact of regional carbon emission reduction have an important impact on the emission reduction efforts of carbon emission enterprises.Based on this,this paper puts forward the policies and suggestions of cooperative emission reduction by multiple stakeholders,which have theoretical value and practical significance for promoting the realization of the"Dual Carbon"goal.
作者 袁亮 祁煜智 何伟军 吴霞 YUAN Liang;QI Yu-zhi;HE Wei-jun;WU Xia(School of Economics and Management,China Three Gorges University,Yichang 443000,China;School of Law and Public Administration of China Three Gorges University,Yichang 443000,China)
出处 《中国环境科学》 EI CAS CSCD 北大核心 2023年第7期3775-3786,共12页 China Environmental Science
基金 国家社科基金资助重大项目(2019ZDA089) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(72104127,71478101,72004116) 教育部人文社会科学研究项目(20YJCGJW009)。
关键词 碳减排合作 碳盈余政府 碳赤字政府 微分博弈 系统动力学 carbon emission reduction cooperation carbon surplus government carbon deficit government differential game system dynamics
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