奖惩组合政策下企业策略性环境治理演化博弈

evolution game analysis of enterprise’s strategic environmental governance with the effect of different combinations

为了制定合理的奖惩政策抑制企业策略性环境治理行为,基于动机—行为—绩效分析框架,构建地方政府与企业的演化博弈模型,探讨政府奖惩组合政策对企业策略性环境治理行为演化的影响,分析不同奖惩组合政策下系统实现演化稳定状态的条件,以及最优奖惩组合政策下各参数变化对企业实施前瞻性环境治理概率的影响.研究表明:当政府实施静态惩罚和静态补贴组合政策时,系统无法渐进稳定于中心点;当实施动态惩罚和静态补贴、静态惩罚和动态补贴、动态惩罚和动态补贴3种组合政策时,系统存在演化稳定策略.当企业因前瞻性环境治理获得的声誉收益小于某阈值时,动态惩罚和静态补贴为最优奖惩政策;当声誉收益大于该阈值时,动态惩罚和动态补贴为最优奖惩政策.地方政府对企业前瞻性环境治理行为的补贴金额过高,补贴激励效应会扭曲,补贴效应出现反转.

The reasonable combination of reward policies and punishment policies was designed to prevent enterprises from conducting strategic environmental governance.In this paper,an evolutionary game model was conducted to analyze the interrelationship between the local government and the enterprise based on the framework of motivation-behavior-performance.Firstly,the impacts of different combinations of reward policies and punishment policies on the evolution of the enterprise’s strategic environmental governance behavior were explored.Secondly,the conditions for system’s evolutionary stability with the effect of different combinations of reward policies and punishment policies were discussed.Thirdly,the impacts of each parameter on the probability of implementing proactive environmental governance were analyzed in the case of the optimal combination policies.The obtained results showed that if the combination policy of static punishment and static subsidy was implemented by the local government,the system could not gradually stabilize at the central point;the combination policies such as“dynamic punishments and static subsidy”,“static punishment and dynamic subsidies”,and“dynamic punishments and dynamic subsidies”were implemented,there existed the system’s evolutionary stability strategy.If the reputation gain obtained by proactive environmental governance was smaller than the threshold value,the combination of dynamic punishments and static subsidy was the optimal collaborative policy.If the reputation gain was greater than the threshold value,the combination of dynamic punishments and dynamic subsidies was the optimal collaborative policy.When the subsidy amount of proactive governance behavior was too high,the incentive effect of the subsidy was distorted,and the subsidy effect was reversed.