考虑不同归属情形的UGC平台增值服务投资与运营策略研究

Value-Added Service Investment and Operation Strategy of UGC Platform Considering Different Access Platform Situations

针对考虑内容创作者不同归属情形下的用户生成内容平台,讨论该类平台的增值服务投资、广告投放水平和内容制作费定价策略。通过构建垄断和双寡头竞争模型,对比分析内容创作者在单归属和多归属时平台的运营策略。研究发现:(1)当平台的增值服务投资系数较大时,平台会提高增值服务投资水平;而平台的广告投放水平和内容制作费定价在垄断情形下会提高,在竞争情形下则降低。(2)当边际增值服务投资成本较大时,平台会降低增值服务投资水平;而在垄断情形下,平台还会降低广告投放水平和内容制作费定价。(3)在竞争情形且内容创作者多归属时,平台进行增值服务投资的门槛最低。

We discuss value-added service investment,ad placement levels,and content production fee pricing strategies for UGC(user generated content)platforms that consider different access platform scenarios for content generators.With the monopoly and duopoly competition models,we compare and analyze the operational strategies of platforms when content generators have single-platform access and two-platform access.The results show that:①Platforms will increase the level of value-added service investment when the platform’s value-added service investment coefficient is large,while the platform’s advertising level and content production fee pricing will increase in a monopoly scenario and decrease in a competitive scenario.②When the marginal value-added service investment cost is large,the platform will reduce the level of value-added service investment,while in a monopoly situation,the platform will reduce the level of advertising and content production fee pricing,which will not be affected in a competitive situation.③When content generators access both platforms,the platform has the lowest threshold for investment in value-added services in competitive situations.