地方经济增长的目标驱动机制与实证检验

The Target Driven Mechanism and Empirical Testing of Local Economic Growth

设定经济增长目标是地方政府发展经济的典型方式,剖析目标驱动增长的内在机制对于推动经济实现质的有效提升和量的合理增长具有重要意义。通过构造并求解“上级政府(委托人)—下级政府(代理人)”间的目标激励合约,发现目标的激励效果取决于代理人完成目标的相对收益,相对收益提高,代理人努力程度随目标的上升而提高;若相对收益下降,继续保持高目标反而会挤出代理人的努力,理性的委托人应适当下调目标。经验分析上,利用2003—2020年地级市经济增长目标数据对模型结论进行验证,发现目标能够引领增长;以2013年中组部发文弱化GDP考核为时间节点,发现目标激励强度的下降会促使地方政府适度下调增长目标。

Setting economic growth target is a typical way for local economy development.Analyzing the intrinsic mechanism of target-driven growth is important to promote the economy to achieve effective quality improvement and reasonable quantitative growth.By constructing and solving the target incentive contract of“higher level government(principal)-lower level government(agent)”,it is found that the incentive effect of the target depends on the relative benefit of the agent to accomplish the target.If the relative benefit is high,the agent’s effort increases with the rise of the target;if the relative benefit decreases,keeping the high target will instead crowd out the agent’s effort,and the rational principal should adjust the target downward appropriately.The empirical analysis of city level economic growth target data(2003-2020)provides evidence for the theoretical model.It is found that targets can lead economic growth.Taking the issuance of the document by the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee in 2013 to weaken GDP assessment as the time point,it is also found that the local government will adjust the target downward appropriately when the incentive intensity of the growth target declines.