基于演化博弈的智慧物流园区协同创新

Collaborative Innovation of Intelligent Logistics Parks Based on Evolutionary Game

运用演化博弈方法构建管委会、物流企业及科研机构的三方协同创新模型,分析其演化过程,通过模拟仿真分析不同情形下三方的协同创新策略选择。研究表明:成本分担系数、收益分配系数及违约系数对管委会、物流企业及科研机构的影响存在差异,通常情况下,管委会选择积极支持协同创新;在低层次的成本分担系数下,物流企业参与协同创新而科研机构退出;在中高层次的收益分配系数下,物流企业选择参与协同创新,科研机构选择在中低层次下参与协同创新;在低层次的违约系数下,物流企业与科研机构退出协同创新,中高层次系数下选择参与协同创新。

Using the evolutionary game method,we constructed a collaborative innovation model involving the three parties of management committee,logistics enterprises and scientific research institutions,analyzed its evolution process,and simulated the collaborative innovation strategies of the three parties in different situations.The research shows that the cost sharing coefficient,income distribution coefficient and default coefficient have different impacts on the three parties and generally speaking,the management committee would actively support collaborative innovation;with low cost sharing coefficient,logistics enterprises would choose to participate in collaborative innovation while scientific research institutions would opt out;logistics enterprises would choose to participate in collaborative innovation under medium-to-high income distribution coefficient,and scientific research institutions do so under medium-to-low income distribution coefficient;and both logistics enterprises and scientific research institutions would withdraw from collaborative innovation with low default coefficient,but choose to participate with medium-to-high default coefficient.