摘要
中国上市公司的股权结构比较集中,大股东与中小股东之间面临着第二类代理难题,大股东对中小股东权益的损害事件也屡屡出现。通过系统梳理国内外相关文献发现,大股东掏空行为在动机、方式等方面已基本达成共识,但在内部治理有效性的研究方面存在不同观点。基于此,对大股东掏空的研究成果进行整理,并进一步探究中小股东的公司治理作用,为今后大股东掏空及公司治理研究提供借鉴。
The shareholding structure of listed companies in China is relatively concentrated,major shareholders and small and medium-sized shareholders are faced with a huge second type of agency problem,and incidents of damage to the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders by major shareholders often occurres repeatedly.Through systematic combing of relevant literature at home and abroad,it is found that the tunneling behavior of major shareholders has basically reached a consensus on motives and methods,but there are different views on the effectiveness of internal governance.Based on this,the research results of the tunneling of major shareholders are sorted out,and the role of corporate governance of small and medium-sized shareholders is further explored,so as to provide reference for the future research on the tunneling of major shareholders and corporate governance in China.
作者
王月晗
WANG Yuehan(School of Economics,Gansu University of Political Science and Law,Lanzhou 730070,China)
出处
《科技和产业》
2023年第12期113-116,共4页
Science Technology and Industry
关键词
大股东
掏空行为
中小股东利益保护
strong stock holder
tunneling behavior
protection of the interests of minority shareholders