特许经营项目合同再谈判阶段参与方决策行为博弈分析

Game Analysis of Participants’Decision-making Behavior in the Renegotiation Stage of Franchise Project for Sewage Treatment

为了分析特许经营项目提前终止协议合同再谈判阶段社会资本的机会主义行为,引入前景理论从关系终止和实体中止合同再谈判两个方面建立了政府、社会资本和公众三方的演化博弈模型。研究发现,合同再谈判阶段政府对机会主义行为惩罚的大小、社会资本对机会主义行为的收益感知是影响社会资本机会主义行为选择的关键因素,并提出激励公众参与特许经营项目合同谈判阶段运行监督,升级政府监管模式,降低各方监管成本和信息获取成本是建立政府主导、公众协同参与联动治理机制的重要保障,研究成果可为建立政府与公众联动治理机制提供政策依据。

In order to analyze the opportunistic behavior of social capital in the contract renegotiation stage of early termination of franchise projects,an evolutionary game model of government,social capital and the public is established from two aspects:relationship termination and entity termination of contract renegotiation.It is found that the punishment of government on opportunistic behavior and social capital's perception of the benefits of opportunistic behavior are the key factors affecting the choice of opportunistic behavior of social capital.It is proposed that encouraging the public to participate in the operation supervision in the contract negotiation stage of franchise projects,upgrading the government supervision mode,and reducing the supervision cost and information acquisition cost of all parties are important guarantees for establishing the linkage governance mechanism of government-led and public participation.The research results provide policy basis for establishing the linkage governance mechanism between the government and the public.