基于演化博弈的双阶段农村公路养护研究

Research on Two-Stage Rural Road Maintenance Based on Evolutionary Game

为解决农村公路养护中资金匮乏和人员参与积极性差等问题,构建了双阶段政府与村民的演化博弈模型,并对村民的参与行为进行数值仿真,同时分析了长期重复博弈的状态下达到合作的条件。结果表明:农村公路养护仍需坚持政府的主导;政府可通过降低成本,设置奖惩机制等方式引导村民积极参与,但政府的奖励措施效果有限;维护工作的长期性需要强化村民的风险意识和对长期利益的重视。双阶段演化博弈模型可用于分析农村公路养护中主体的行为策略,有利于缓解政府财政负担,使村民的主体地位得到发挥。

To solve the problems of lack of funds and poor motivation of personnel participation in rural road maintenance,a two-stage evolutionary game model between government and villagers was constructed and a numerical simulation of villagers participation behavior was conducted.The conditions for reaching cooperation under the state of the long-term repeated game were analyzed.The results showed that rural road maintenance still needs to adhere to the government's leading role.The government can guide villagers by reducing costs and setting up reward and punishment mechanisms,but the effect of government incentives is limited.The long-term nature of maintenance work needs to strengthen villagers'risk awareness and attention to long-term benefits.The two-stage evolutionary game model can be used to analyze the behavioral strategies of subjects in rural road maintenance,which is conducive to alleviating the financial burden of the government and bringing the main position of villagers into play.