“试探性违规-选择性容忍”:对运动式监管失灵的组织学解释

“Tentative Violations”and“Selective Tolerance”:An Organizational Interpretation of the Failure of Campaign-style Regulations

实践表明,随着运动式监管的重复上演,其治理成效可能随着监管双方的持续互动而由强渐弱,但既有研究对治理链条的末端互动和治理绩效的渐进演变着墨较少。本文将历时性的分析视角带入监管链条末端,结合校外培训监管实践,清晰呈现监管双方互动与运动式监管失灵之间的逻辑联系:当上级初次围绕某一议题或政策发生重大调整的领域发起运动式监管时,慑于自上而下的压力信号和囿于上级督查的信息不明,基层监管部门通常会高标准地推进治理,而监管对象一时间也很难把握“合规的边界”,因而更倾向于积极配合或暂停营业;但随着治理转回常规,为平衡合规程度和成本控制之间的张力,监管对象会在底线合规逻辑的驱动下开始“试探性违规”。同时,面对任务膨胀与资源约束二者之间的持续张力,基层监管部门会遵循自我减负的行动逻辑,对“试探性违规”采取有的放矢的“选择性容忍”;随着运动式监管的重复上演,监管双方也将通过多次的“试探性违规”和“选择性容忍”逐渐就“合规的边界”达成默契,进而导致运动式监管走向失灵。

Campaign-style governance is known for its efficient integration of resources and rapid achievement of goals.Practice shows,however,that with the repeated performance of campaign-style regulations,the governance effects may be weakened from a position of strength and by the continuous interactions between the two parties to the regulation.But existing research pays little attention to the interactions at the end of the regulatory chain or to the gradual evolution of governance performance.In light of this,this article introduces a longitudinal analytical perspective to the end of the regulatory chain based on the practice of private tutoring regulations in F District,C City,to clearly identify the logical relationship between the interactions of the two parties at the end of the regulatory chain and the failure of campaign-style regulations.Faced with complex governance challenges,when engaging in regulatory work,governments at all levels often rely on campaign-style regulations to achieve their governance goals.When higher-level governments initiate campaign-style regulations around a certain topic for the first time or in areas that require significant policy adjustments,the grassroots regulatory authorities are deterred in their supervisory work by pressure signals transmitted from top to bottom and by unclear information from the high-level inspections carried out by their superiors who promote governance work with high standards.In response,the regulated parties,lacking immediate countermeasures,have no choice but to cooperate or to evade scrutiny.But as governance work returns to a routine state,in order to balance the tensions between compliance and cost controls,the regulatory objects will begin to engage in“tentative violations”driven by bottom line compliance logic.At the same time,facing the continuous tensions between task inflation and resource constraints,the grassroots regulatory authorities will follow a logic to reduce their own burdens and will engage in targeted“selective tolerance”.Of course,the continuous interactions between the regulatory authorities and the regulatory objects require support by two structural conditions.One is the technological feasibility brought about by the heterogeneity of the regulatory tasks.Regulatory tasks or matters are not monolithic,and there is heterogeneity among them,especially in terms of observability.The second condition is the local knowledge shared by the regulatory authorities and the regulatory objects due to their long-term coexistence in the same grassroots context.By bringing a longitudinal perspective to the end of the governance chain,this article introduces the dynamic process of continuous decline in governance performance with the repeated performance of campaign-style regulations,further extending the causal analysis chain of campaign-style regulatory failures and thus taking a step toward solving this analytical“puzzle”.