摘要
一项制度能否得以延续,取决于该制度有用性和利益协调性两个方面。水稻种植的劳动特征内生出了村庄内部集体行动的需要,强化了农户之间的利益相关性,使得农地调整得以持续发生,从而降低了地权的稳定性。文章通过构建演化博弈模型推导农户利益相关性如何影响农地调整发生的概率,结合CLDS2014年201个村庄样本讨论水稻种植对地权稳定性的影响。研究结果表明:(1)水稻种植能够显著提高村庄农地调整发生的概率。与其他村庄相比,以水稻种植为主的村庄,其农地调整发生的概率显著更高,获得农地确权证书的农户比例则显著更低,因而,水稻种植村庄的地权稳定性更低。(2)机制检验发现,水稻种植村庄的宗族文化更加活跃。相应地,宗族文化活跃的村庄地权稳定性受到破坏的概率更高。(3)农业机械对农业劳动力的替代,弱化了集体行动的必要性,从而降低了地权不稳定的可能性。在考虑各种可能存在的内生性问题之后,主要结论依旧稳健。文章认为,农地制度“植根”于农业的生产特性及其耕作文化,因此农地调整有其存在的合理性。随着耕作方式的改变,尤其是农业机械化对水稻种植劳动模式的替代,农地调整的现象将会逐渐消失,地权的稳定性将不断得到提高。
Rice planting endogenously induces the need for collective action,strengthens the relevance of interests between farmers,and thereby reduces the land rights stability.This paper constructs an evolutionary game model to deduce how the coordination of interests of farmers affects the probability of farmland reallocation and discusses the impact of rice planting on the stability of land rights based on 201 village samples from CLDS of 2014.The results show that:first,rice planting can significantly increase the probability of farmland reallocation in villages.Compared with other villages,villages where rice are mainly food crops have a significantly higher probability of farmland reallocation,and the proportion of farmers who have obtained farmland certificates is significantly lower,therefore,rice planting weakns the land rights stability;second,the mechanism test shows that the clan culture in rice-growing villages is more active,accordingly,villages with active clan cul⁃ture are more likely to undergo unstable land tenure;third,the substitution of agricultural machinery for agricultural labor weakens the necessity of collective action,thereby increasing the land rights stability.The main conclusions of this article re⁃main robust after considering various possible endogenous issues.The main contributions of this paper are as follows.First,we discuss the possibility of agricultural land reallocation un⁃der different circumstances from the perspectives of individual independent game,associated game and group game.This pa⁃per provides an explanatory analytical framework for China's rural land reallocation by using evolutionary games.Second,this study provides a possible explanation for the north-south difference in agricultural land rights,making up for the lack of explanations for the spatial distribution of agricultural land reallocation in related studies.In the institutional arrangement of agricultural land rights,it is generally believed that the stability of land rights can improve economic efficiency,while the re⁃allocation of land rights can help improve equity,but the existing literature generally ignores the endogenous role of land use,especially the characteristics of crop planting.We fill in the gaps in this literature.It can be considered that the charac⁃teristics of the agricultural land system are“planted”,and it is an institutional tool for rural society to maintain the collective cooperation of farmers under the specific agricultural planting method and its constraints.The findings of this paper have significant implications.The continuation of farmland reallocation is endogenous to the agricultural economic foundation of the village,and it is the result of the choice after the coordination of the collective game of farmers,which has the rationality of its existence.Farmland reallocation may change with changes in village planting struc⁃ture or planting methods,especially as the level of agricultural mechanization continues to increase,farmland reallocation may gradually decline,and farm property rights will gradually become more secure.It can be considered that the reallocation of agricultural land has a historical stage.Therefore,making full use of the institutional dividends of farmland titling,vigor⁃ously carrying out farmland consolidation,strengthening the supply of public goods such as agricultural infrastructure(espe⁃cially irrigation),encouraging contiguous planting of farmland management,and improving the level of agricultural mechani⁃zation are the keys to curbing agricultural production and important policy options to improve the security of land tenure.
作者
洪炜杰
罗必良
Hong Weijie;Luo Biliang
出处
《南方经济》
北大核心
2023年第7期1-20,共20页
South China Journal of Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目“非农转移、代际转换与农地撂荒发生机理研究”(72203064)
国家社会科学基金重大项目“乡村振兴与深化农村土地制度改革”(19ZDA115)
广东省社科规划青年项目“农地撂荒的发生机理及其政策启示:基于农户承包地规模的考察”(GD22YGL20)资助。
关键词
水稻种植
集体行动
农地调整
农地确权
地权稳定性
Rice Planting
Collective Actions
Farmland Reallocation
Land Titling
Land Rights Stability