摘要
为解决科创企业融资难、融资贵的问题,目前,我国运行的投贷联动模式对于落实创新驱动战略有重要意义。在现实中,科创企业为获得资金支持存在信用违约风险,这对投贷联动的发展造成了一定的阻碍。本文通过构建投贷联动模式中科创企业、风投机构与银行三方演化合作博弈模型,分析了可能的最优解以及影响各方最优策略的决定因素。研究发现:投贷联动通过提高信用成本可以有效减缓企业的违约行为,缓解信息不对称问题,使三方收益实现最大化,进而可以促进三方之间建立合作关系。
To help sci-tech innovation enterprises tackle their financing problems,China has practiced a new model of"investment-loan linkage",which is of great signifi⁃cance to implement innovation-driven strategies.However,the enterprises are likely to encounter credit default in seeking financial support,which then will cause some obsta⁃cles to developing the new model.By constructing a game model of three parties,i.e.sci tech innovation enterprises,venture capital institutions and banks,this paper makes an analysis of the possible optimal solutions and the determinants affecting them.The re⁃sults show that increase of credit cost can effectively reduce defaults of enterprises and ease the problem of information asymmetry.Consequently,the three parties can maxi⁃mize their respective benefits and establish cooperative relationship.
作者
吴瑶瑶
WU Yao-yao(Qilu University of Technology,Jinan Shandong 250100)
出处
《天津商务职业学院学报》
2023年第2期14-25,共12页
Journal of Tianjin College of Commerce
关键词
投贷联动
科创企业
风投机构
演化博弈
investment-loan linkage
sci-tech innovation enterprise
venture capital institution
Evolutionary Game Theory