新媒体环境下公众参与的企业碳排放监管演化博弈分析

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Public Participation in EnterpriseCarbon Emission Regulation Under the New Media Environment

碳排放问题关系到我国“双碳”目标能否如期实现,关系到经济发展和人民群众的身体健康。基于系统稳定性视角,讨论了新媒体环境下企业、公众和政府之间的行为策略选择,采用演化博弈的方法,构建了企业、公众和政府的三方演化博弈模型,分析了博弈主体间的稳定策略组合,运用MATLAB工具对演化过程进行仿真。结果表明:(1)媒体对事件如实报道的概率对各博弈主体的行为选择有重要影响,新媒体环境越追求真实、理性和公正,对企业碳排放的监管越能起到正向促进作用;(2)降低政府的监管成本有利于企业的策略选择朝合规碳排放的方向演化;(3)政府对企业的处罚力度也是影响博弈主体行为选择的重要因素。建议政府要充分发挥新媒体的监管作用,降低监管成本,提升监管效率,建立和完善相应的奖惩机制,加大对违规碳排放企业的处罚力度。

The issue of carbon emissions is related to whether China′s"carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals"can be achieved as scheduled,economic development and the health of the people.Based on the perspective of system stability,this paper discusses the choice of behavior strategies among enterprises,the public and the government in the new media environment,uses the method of evolutionary game to build a three-party evolutionary game model of enterprises,the public and the government,analyzes the combination of stability strategies among game players,and uses MATLAB tools to simulate the evolution process.The results show that:(1)the probability of the media′s truthful reporting of the event has an important impact on the behavior choice of the game subjects.The more realistic,rational and fair the new media environment is,the more positive the role of the regulation of carbon emissions of enterprises will be;(2)reducing the regulatory cost of the government is conducive to the evolution of the strategic choice of enterprises towards compliant carbon emissions;(3)the government′s punishment on enterprises is also an important factor that affects the behavior choice of game players.It is suggested that the government should give full play to the regulatory role of new media,reduce regulatory costs,improve regulatory efficiency,establish and improve the corresponding reward and punishment mechanism,and increase the punishment of illegal carbon emission enterprises.