论康德对洛克经验主义的批判

On Kant's Critique of Locke's Empiricism

康德对洛克经验主义的批判构成了其先验哲学的一个重要主题,但它并未引起学界足够重视。本文旨在重构并展示康德对洛克严密而细腻的批评,提出康德所理解的经验主义首先是概念习得意义上的经验主义,其次才是信念辩护意义上的经验主义。在此基础上,本文指出康德的洛克批判包含了截然不同的两个向度。其一,例示于经验之内的纯粹知性概念表明了洛克的习得经验主义在理论上的不完整性;其二,超越于经验之外的纯粹理性概念则同时揭露了其习得经验主义和辩护经验主义在逻辑上的不一致性。

Kant's critique of Locke's empiricism constitutes an important theme in his transcendental philosophy,which unfortunately has long been ignored in the academia.This article aims at reconstructing and displaying Kant's subtle and rigorous criticism of Locke,thereby filling the above-mentioned gap in the literature.In the first place,this article points out that the empiricism understood by Kant is first and foremost acquisitional empiricism with regard to concepts,and only secondly justificatory empiricism with regard to beliefs.Based on this interpretation,this article proceeds to argue that Kant's criticism includes two distinct dimensions.For one thing,the pure concepts of understanding,which are instantiated in experience,disclose the theoretical incompleteness of Locke's acquisitional empiricism.For another,the pure concepts of reason,which transcend the bounds of experience,reveal the logical inconsistency of both Locke's acquisitional empiricism and his justificatory empiricism.