摘要
近年来,中国高端芯片制造遭遇的严重“卡脖子”问题已成为影响产业链自主安全乃至国家经济安全的突出短板。有别于现有研究多将中国高端芯片制造难以实现突破归因于技术能力不足或地缘政治阻碍,本文论证了根植于现有企业市场势力的产业组织因素同样对潜在进入者构成了很高的壁垒。本文发现,当前高端芯片制造市场的主要参与者ASML、三星、台积电、英特尔之间建立了较为紧密的“1+3”研发合作联盟,由此抬高了技术和资本双密集行业的进入壁垒,引致高端芯片制造环节表现出“小院高墙”式的组织结构特征。通过构建嵌入异质性研发合作的网络博弈模型发现,在高端芯片制造“小院”中存在“上游研发合作,下游产品竞争”的独特竞争范式,即主要市场主体既具备寡占地位,彼此之间又开展激烈的竞争,并因深度捆绑的研发合作关系形成了较为稳定的市场均衡。潜在进入者若试图在这一市场上“分一杯羹”,就会影响现有企业的均衡利润,必然会遭到联合抵制,即产生“高墙”效应,这也是包括中国企业在内的市场主体进入该领域面临的难以克服的制约因素之一。进一步,本文采用多情景数值模拟和稳健性检验,设计了中国突破“小院高墙”封锁可能选择的路径,以及与在位市场主体开展“合纵连横”、逐步融入产业生态的市场策略。本文的政策启示是,把中国企业突破高端芯片制造“卡脖子”短板的路径扩展到市场主体的经济利益实现与分配上,为改进现行集成电路产业政策提供了基于产业组织理论的学理性思考和新的视角。
In recent years,China's high-end chip manufacturing has faced a serious“stranglehold”problem,which has become a prominent weakness affecting the security of the national economy.Unlikecurrent studies that attribute difficulties of China's high-end chip manufacturing to technical or politicalfactors,this paper demonstrates that the economic factors rooted in the industrial organization structureare equally important.This paper finds that the main market players in the high-end chip manufacturing,such as ASML,Intel,Samsung and TSMC,have established a relatively close“1+3”RD cooperationalliance,but they have not colluded with each other,but formed a unique ecology of“upstream RDcooperation and downstream product competition,”which strengthens the high barriers to entry,leadingto the emergence of the market feature of“small-yard and high-fence.”This paper constructs a general network game model,and embeds the RD cooperation networkcomposed of two heterogeneous markets of lithography equipment and chip products into it to theoreticallydeconstruct the current market equilibrium of high-end chip manufacturing industry.This paper finds thatin the“small-yard”of high-end chip manufacturing,main market players not only have oligopoly status,but also carry out fierce competition with each other,forming a more stable market equilibrium due to thedeep binding of RD cooperation.If potential entrants try to enter into this market,it will affectequilibrium profits of existing enterprises.Existing enterprises will boycott to produce a“high-fence”effect,which is one of the largest constraints for market players,including Chinese enterprises,to enterthis field.Through scenario simulation,this paper finds that the key to breaking through the“small-yardand high-fence”is to find a partner from the“big three.”With the assistance of ASML and Samsung,anall-round RD cooperation relation with the“big three”can finally achieve a comprehensivebreakthrough.Further robustness tests show that the decline in RD cooperation earnings will have asignificant impact on market entry barriers.The policy implications of this paper extend the path for Chinese enterprises to break through weaklinks of high-end chip manufacturing to the realization and distribution of economic benefits,andprovides a new perspective for improving existing integrated circuit industry policy based on the industrialorganizational theory.Firstly,as for major cutting-edge technologies and leading industries,thegovernment must carry out forward-looking layout to maintain policy strength and continuity.Secondly,China should create conditions to actively carry out various forms of cooperation with leading countries inintegrated circuit technology,and achieve interest exchange on a larger scale.Thirdly,industrial policiesshould pay more attention to the cultivation of industrial ecology,encourage and guide scientific researchinstitutions and market players to accelerate single point breakthroughs in the subdivision fields,andgradually penetrate from the periphery to the“small-yard and high-fence”from point to area.Fourthly,we should strengthen the penetration of supply chain and industrial ecology of integrated circuit industrywith the help of capital market,so as to enhance the control ability of industry.On this basis,this paperdesigns the possible path for China to break through the blockade,and the market strategy of cooperatingwith the incumbent market players.
作者
渠慎宁
杨丹辉
兰明昊
QU Shen-ning;YJANG Dan-hui;LAN Ming-hao(Institute of Industrial Economics,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences;Department of Regional Economy,National Development and Reform Commission)
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第6期62-80,共19页
China Industrial Economics
基金
阐释党的十九届五中全会精神国家社会科学基金重大项目“推进新型工业化与经济体系优化升级”(批准号21ZDA021)
中国社会科学院创新工程项目“新兴产业高质量发展研究”、中国社会科学院登峰战略优势学科(产业经济学)的资助。
关键词
集成电路
芯片制造
小院高墙
进入壁垒
突破路径
integrated circuit
chip manufacturing
small-yard and high-fence
barriers to entry
breakthrough path