随机需求下考虑零售商损失厌恶的双渠道供应链融资策略研究

Financing Strategy for a Dual-channel Supply Chain that Faces Loss-averse Retailers and Stochastic Demands

针对随机需求情形下供应链融资策略问题,考虑资金约束零售商的损失厌恶态度,基于Stackelberg博弈分别构建了贸易信贷模型和银行信贷模型,分析了双渠道供应链的最优运营决策,并通过数值分析揭示了零售商的损失厌恶系数和初始资金对供应链运营决策和融资策略的影响。结果表明,零售商的最优订购量关于损失厌恶系数单调递减,且相比于贸易信贷,银行信贷下最优订购量的递减速度较大。损失厌恶系数较大时,零售商和制造商均偏向于银行信贷;反之,双方均偏向于贸易信贷。初始资金较大时,零售商和制造商均偏向于银行信贷;反之,制造商偏向于贸易信贷,零售商偏向于银行信贷,此时制造商可以通过将批发价格限定在一定区间来实现双渠道供应链的帕累托改进。此外,当消费者的零售渠道偏好较大时,银行信贷是双渠道供应链的均衡融资策略。当需求波动较小时,贸易信贷是双方的均衡融资策略。

Financing strategies for a dual channel supply chain that faces stochastic demands and loss-averse and financially constrained retailers are studied.By using the Stackelberg game theory,we establish a trade credit model and a bank credit model and then analyze supply chain members’optimal operational decisions under the two financing models.Our numerical analysis reveals the impact of retailers’loss aversion coefficient and initial capital on their decisions.The results show that retailers’optimal order quantity decreases in line with their loss aversion coefficient,and the decline rate of optimal order quantity under bank credit is larger than that under trade credit.When the loss aversion coefficient is relatively large,retailers and manufacturers prefer bank credit.Otherwise,both sides prefer trade credit.When initial capital is relatively large,retailers and manufacturers prefer bank credit.Otherwise,manufacturers prefer trade credit and retailers prefer bank credit.In this case,manufacturers could achieve Pareto improvement of the dual-channel supply chain by limiting the wholesale price to a certain range.In addition,when consumers prefer retail channel,bank credit is an equilibrium financing strategy for a dual-channel supply chain.When demand fluctuation is small,trade credit is an equilibrium financing strategy for both parties.