控股股东股权质押与金融资产配置--基于非控股大股东退出威胁的调节效应分析

Equity Pledge of Controlling Shareholders and Financial Asset Allocation:Analysis of the Moderating Ef⁃fect Based on the Exit Threat of Non-controlling Major Shareholders

基于2007—2021年A股实体上市公司数据,探究控股股东股权质押情景下,非控股大股东退出威胁对金融资产配置的治理作用。研究发现,股权质押会显著提高金融资产配置水平,且质押比例越大,企业金融资产配置比重越高;非控股大股东退出威胁对控股股东股权质押下的金融资产配置有显著抑制作用。进一步地,动机检验发现股权质押后的金融资产配置行为是出于资本套利动机;机制检验发现股权质押通过加剧企业融资约束和降低信息透明度增加金融资产配置;异质性检验发现在低市场竞争程度和高股权集中度企业中,股权质押对金融资产配置的提升作用较显著,此时非控股大股东退出威胁仍能有效发挥治理作用。研究结论为引导企业“脱虚返实”和完善大股东治理提供了经验证据。

Based on the data of A-share entity listed companies from 2007 to 2021,we explore the governance effect of the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders on the allocation of finan-cial assets under the scenario of controlling shareholders’equity pledge.The study found that equity pledge will significantly improve the level of financial asset allocation,and the greater the proportion of pledge,the higher the proportion of financial assets allocated by enterprises;The exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders has a significant inhibitory effect on the allocation of financial assets under the equity pledge of controlling shareholders.Further,the motivation test found that the financial asset allocation behavior after equity pledge was motivated by capital arbitrage;The mecha-nism test found that equity pledge increased the allocation of financial assets by worsening the fi-nancing constraints of enterprises and reducing information transparency;The heterogeneity test found that in the scenario of equity pledge,controlling shareholders significantly improve the level of financial asset allocation in enterprises with low market competition and high equity concentration.At this time,theexit threat of non-controlling major shareholders can still effectively play a gover-nance role.The research conclusion of the article provides empirical evidence for guiding enterpris-es to“get rid of virtual reality”and improve the governance of major shareholders.