寡头市场中平台企业横向并购对竞争和创新的影响研究

Impact of Platforms’Horizontal Mergers on Competition and Innovation in Oligopolistic Markets

本文以大型在位平台企业之间的横向并购为研究背景,系统探讨在位平台企业之间的横向并购对竞争和创新的影响,以期为反垄断执法机构进行经营者集中反垄断审查提供理论参考。基于双边市场理论和并购理论,本文通过纳入网络外部性特征,构建了平台企业横向并购对竞争和创新影响的理论模型。研究结果表明,当创新效率存在大幅提升时,平台企业并购并不必然提高均衡价格和均衡创新水平,也不一定会降低消费者福利。因此,反垄断执法机构在对大型在位平台企业之间的并购进行反垄断审查时,需要同时分析价格效应和创新等非价格效应,全面评估并购的竞争影响和福利影响。

Frequent mergers among large incumbent platforms lead to a gradual increase in the market concentration in the platform economy and the formation of an oligopolistic market structure,arousing widespread concern.Based on the two-sided markets theory and the merger theory in the traditional economy,this paper constructs a theoretical model of the influence of horizontal mergers among incumbent platforms on competition and innovation by incorporating network externality characteristics.By examining the competition effect and welfare effect of mergers among incumbent platforms,this paper aims to provide a theoretical reference for anti-monopoly enforcers.Compared with the existing literature,the theoretical contributions of this paper lie in improving the research findings on the platform economy theory,enhancing the effectiveness of anti-monopoly enforcers in the platform economy,and improving the feasibility and applicability of competition policy.Based on equilibrium analysis and welfare analysis,this paper draws the following conclusions and puts forward corresponding policy recommendations.First,the impact of platform mergers on prices is uncertain,and network externalities constrain the price level of platforms.Therefore,it is necessary for anti-monopoly enforcers to comprehensively analyze the price effect of incumbent platform mergers and conduct a case-by-case analysis.Second,when innovation efficiency is greatly improved,platform mergers do not necessarily reduce innovation.On the contrary,depending on the improvement in innovation efficiency,incumbent platforms involved in mergers have an incentive to increase their innovation level.At the same time,the increase in network externalities may enhance the innovation level of the merging parties.Therefore,anti-monopoly enforcers should fully consider the price effects of mergers,pay close attention to the effect of platform mergers on innovation,and comprehensively examine the competition effect of platform mergers.Third,platform firms have an intrinsic incentive to engage in mergers due to the ability of platform firms to internalize negative externalities of pricing and innovation.Therefore,anti-monopoly enforcers should attach great importance to merger transactions between incumbent platforms and thoroughly analyze the competition effect of mergers.It is important to examine reasons that enhance the profits of merger participants,and to analyze the factors that limit their ability to enhance profitability.Finally,when innovation efficiency is greatly improved,platforms may reduce prices and enhance innovation,thereby improving consumer welfare.Therefore,anti-monopoly enforcers should allow for the efficiency defense,and examine the innovation efficiency generated by platform mergers to balance the anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects of mergers.