碳限额下考虑风险规避的低碳供应链联合减排决策研究

Study on Joint Emission Reduction Decision-making of Low-carbon Supply Chain Considering Risk Aversion under Carbon Caps

在一个制造商和一个零售商组成的二级供应链中,探讨碳限额和供应链成员风险规避行为对系统成员决策的影响,最后通过数值算例进行验证。研究结果表明:碳限额交易政策下拥有主导权企业获利更多,调整碳交易价格可以有效协调供应链成员的利润;系统成员风险规避特性不利于制造商和零售商的联合碳减排,且对系统成员自身效用具有负效应;零售商分担减排成本行为能减弱制造商风险规避特性对其自身效用的负效应,却加重了自身风险规避特性对效用的损害;集中决策下的联合减排效果最佳,分散决策下供应链效益更优。

The impact of Carbon Caps and the risk aversion characteristics of system members on system optimal decisions for a supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer was studied.Numerical examples are used for verification.The results show that the dominant firm is more profitable under a cap-and-trade policy,but can harmonize the profits of supply chain members by adjusting the price of carbon trading.The risk aversion characteristics of system members is not conducive to the joint carbon reduction of manufacturers and retailers,and it has a negative effect on the utility of system members.Retailers’sharing of abatement costs can weaken the negative effects of manufacturers’risk aversion characteristics on their own utility,but increases the damage to their own utility.Joint emission reductions are better under centralized decision-making,while supply chain benefits are better under decentralized decision-making.