高管晋升激励、审计定价与审计延迟

Executive Promotion Incentives,Audit Pricing and Audit Delay

职位晋升带来的利益差距在激励高管努力工作的同时,也可能诱发高管自利性动机,带来激励负效应。基于此,本文利用2010—2019年中国非金融类A股上市公司的数据,实证检验高管晋升激励对审计定价及审计延迟的影响。研究发现,高管晋升激励与审计定价、审计延迟均呈显著正相关关系,审计定价的提高源于审计投入的增加和风险溢价的收取。进一步研究发现,高管晋升激励与审计费用的相关性在CEO变更频繁时更为明显,此时审计师会进一步收取风险溢价以增加审计费用;产权细分为中央企业和地方国有企业时,高管薪酬激励与审计定价、审计延迟之间的关系差异显著;代理成本在高管晋升激励与审计定价之间发挥部分中介作用。上述结论不仅丰富了高管晋升激励与审计师定价行为的文献研究,而且有助于进一步了解高管晋升激励对审计定价的影响机理。

The benefit gap brought about by job promotion may induce self-interested motivation and bring about negative incentive effects while motivating executives to work hard.Based on this,this paper empirically examines the impact of executive promotion incentives on audit pricing and audit delays using data from Chinese non-financial A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2019.It is found that executive promotion incentives are significantly and positive-ly related to both audit pricing and audit delay,and that the increase in audit pricing stems from the increase in audit in-puts and the charging of risk premiums.Further research found that the correlation between executive promotion incen-tives and audit fees is more pronounced when there are frequent CEO changes,at which point auditors further charge a risk premium to increase audit fees;the relationship between executive compensation incentives and audit pricing and audit delay varies significantly when the ownership is subdivided into centralized state-owned enterprises and local state-owned enterprises;agency costs play a partial mediating role between executive promotion incentives and audit pricing.The above findings not only enrich the literature on executive promotion incentives and auditor pricing behavior,but al-so contribute to a further understanding of the mechanisms by which executive promotion incentives affect audit pricing.