摘要
同样追求法律实证主义回到经验现象、回到实在法本身的基本主张,奥斯丁和凯尔森做出了前后相继但有所不同的尝试。相对于奥斯丁法理学而言,凯尔森一方面解决了一些遗留问题,让实证法理学的研究内容变得严谨完整、独立自足,具有了清晰而合逻辑的边界;但另一方面其体系又出现了超出经验的实证法理学之外的两点突破。这种对“实证”经验现象的超越不但与实证主义要求并不矛盾,而且正是出于经验意义上的实在法及对实在法的所作的逻辑实证主义探索的必然要求。
In the same pursuit of legal positivism to return to the empirical phenomenon,return to the basic proposition of positive law itself,Austin and Kelson made successive but different attempts.Compared with Austin jurisprudence,Kelson on the one hand solved some remaining problems,making positive jurisprudence more rigorous,complete and independent;on the other hand,he made two breakthroughs in his system beyond empirical positive jurisprudence.This transcendence of the empirical phenomena of jurisprudence is not inconsistent with the requirements of positivism,and it is precisely the requirements of positive law in the empirical sense and the logical positivism exploration of positive law itself.
作者
何室鼎
HE Shi-ding(School of Philosophy,Beijing Normal University,Beijing 100875,China)
出处
《河北民族师范学院学报》
2023年第3期80-84,共5页
Journal of Hebei Normal University For Nationalities