代理冲突引发的并购商誉能被抑制吗?——基于产权性质的视角

Can M&A Goodwill Caused by Agency Conflicts be Restrained?——From the Perspective of Nature of Property Rights

选取2011—2020年我国A股(非金融类)当年新增商誉的上市公司为研究样本,实证研究了代理冲突与企业商誉规模之间的关系。研究结果表明:代理冲突越严重,企业的商誉规模越大。此外,文章考虑了产权性质对代理冲突与商誉规模之间关系的调节效应,发现相比于非国有企业,企业的国有性质能够有效抑制代理冲突对商誉规模的影响。进一步分析发现,债务期限结构对上述研究也具有显著的调节作用,即债务期限结构能够有效治理代理冲突所引发的商誉规模增加。研究结果为企业合理控制商誉规模、提高商誉资产的会计信息质量以及防范相关风险提供了经验证据。

This paper empirically studies the relationship between agency conflict and business goodwill scale by selecting the A-share(non-financial)listed companies with new goodwill from 2011 to 2020.The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between agency conflict and the scale of goodwill,that is,the more serious the agency conflict,the larger the scale of business goodwill.In addition,the moderating effect of the nature of property rights on the relationship between agency conflict and goodwill scale is considered,and it is found that compared with non-state-owned enterprises,state-owned nature of enterprises can effectively inhibit the influence of agency conflict on goodwill scale.Further analysis shows that the debt maturity structure also has a significant moderating effect on the above research,that is,the debt maturity structure can effectively manage the increase in goodwill scalecaused by agency conflicts.The research results provide empirical evidence for enterprises to reasonably control the goodwill scale,improve the quality of accounting information of goodwill assets and prevent relevant risks.