债权人保护、会计稳健性与银行贷款定价——基于“打击老赖”政策的证据

Creditor Protection,Accounting Conservatism and Bank Loan Pricing:Evidence Based on the Restricting Extravagant Spending of Enforces Provisions

银行自身保护和外部保护均是防范系统性金融风险的重要方面,但鲜有研究分析银行自身保护与外部保护的关联。依据会计信息进行贷款风险定价和外部债权人保护制度,是银行实现自身保护和外部保护的重要保证。本文基于2010年最高人民法院颁布的《关于限制被执行人高消费的若干规定》政策,分析提高外部债权人保护力度对会计稳健性和银行贷款定价之间关系的影响,探究银行外部保护对自身保护的影响。结果发现,债权人保护力度提高增加了贷款定价对会计稳健性的需求,提高了贷款定价的效率。进一步分析发现,这种作用在违约风险较高以及银行议价能力较弱的情境下更显著。本文提供了银行外部保护影响自身保护的直接证据,也为优化信贷资源配置提供了可行路径。

Both bank self-protection and external protection are important aspects to prevent systemic financial risks,but few studies have analyzed the relationship between selfprotection and external protection.Loan pricing based on accounting information and external creditor protection are important guarantees for banks to realize self-protection and external protection.Based on the restrictive provisions on debtor extravagant consumption published by the Supreme People's Court in 2010,this paper analyzes the influence of enhancing external creditor protection on the relationship between bank loan pricing and accounting conservatism,and explores the influence of bank external protection on self-protection.The results show that the enhancement of creditor protection increases the demand for accounting conservatism in loan pricing and improves the efficiency of loan pricing.Further analysis shows that this effect is more significant when the default risk is high and the bargaining power of banks is weak.This paper provides direct evidence that bank external protection affects selfprotection,and also provides a feasible path to optimize the allocation of credit resources.