演化博弈视角下外部变量对绿色施工及其监管行为的影响

Influence of External Variables on Green Construction and Its Supervision from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

基于演化博弈模型的研究发现,普通施工节约成本和上级奖励力度正向促进政府监管行为,政府监管成本、监管有效率和政府奖惩力度负向影响政府监管行为;政府奖惩力度、监管效率、上级部门奖励力度正向影响承包商绿色施工,政府监管成本负向影响绿色施工;监管部门对监管效率敏感度最高,总承包商对监管成本的敏感度最高。提高政府监管有效率,降低政府监管成本是推动绿色施工发展的关键;总承包商的绿色施工行为,相较于政府奖励,受政府惩罚的影响更大,政府制定奖惩政策时应“重罚轻奖”。

The research based on evolutionary game model shows that the general construction cost saving and strengths of reward from authorities in charge have a positive effect on government supervision;the government supervision cost,supervision efficiency and strengths of government reward and punishment have a negative affect on government supervision;strengths of government reward and punishment,supervision efficiency and strengths of reward and punishment from authorities in charge have a positive effect on the green construction by contractors;and government supervision cost has a negative affect on the green construction.In sum,the supervision department is the most sensitive to supervision efficiency,the general contractor is the most sensitive to supervision cost,and green construction by the general contractor is more affected by government punishment than by government reward.Improving government supervision efficiency and reducing government supervision cost is therefore the key to promote green construction,and government policy of“punishment over reward”is strongly recommended.