摘要
为更好地应对航班延误引发的群体性事件,以机场、旅客、航空公司为群体性事件的博弈主体,明确各个主体在群体性事件中的策略选择,分析其对于群体性事件的影响机理。并基于演化博弈理论,利用复制动态方程,构建三方两两博弈演化模型,采用三个两方博弈模型对航班延误的旅客群体性事件进行分析。在航空公司与旅客、机场与旅客两个博弈模型中,多数情况下,博弈双方在多次博弈后会调整各自的策略,形成一个循环的闭合博弈圈。在机场与航空公司的博弈模型分析中,引入了契约下的核战略的囚徒困境,并得出结论:博弈双方会同时积极应对旅客群体性事件。
In order to better cope with the mass incidents caused by flight delays,airport,passenger and airline were taken as the game subjects of the mass incidents,their strategic choices in the mass incidents were clarified to analyze their influence mechanism on mass incidents.Then,based on the evolutionary game theory and replication dynamic equation,three two-party game models were con-structed to analyze the passenger mass incidents caused by flight delays.In the two game models of airline and passenger,airport and passenger,in most cases,both players will adjust their strategies after several games,forming a circular closed game circle.In the analysis of game model of airport and airline,the prisoners dilemma of nuclear strategy under contract was introduced,and the conclu-sion was drawn that both airport and airline will actively deal with passenger mass incidents at the same time.
作者
李慧
邵荃
LI Hui;SHAO Quan(College of Civil Aviation,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing 211106,China)
出处
《科学技术与工程》
北大核心
2023年第23期10147-10151,共5页
Science Technology and Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金(71874081)
江苏省自然科学基金(BK20201296)
中央高校基本科研业务费(NS2022065)。
关键词
群体性事件
博弈演化
复制动态方程
航班延误
passenger mass incidents
theory of game evolution
replication dynamic equation
flight delay