逻辑学的伦理之维:皮尔士的洞见及其当代回响

The Ethical Dimension of Logic:Peirce’s Insight and Its Echoes in Contemporary Philosophy

皮尔士在1903年哈佛实用主义系列讲座中首次公开提出:推理是一种受控行为,而以推理为研究对象的逻辑学具有一种伦理维度。这一论题不仅在皮尔士本人的实用主义哲学体系中占据关键地位,而且对于今人重新思考逻辑学的本性具有重要启示。援引皮尔士及当代逻辑哲学思想资源,至少可以从“逻辑学研究对象”“逻辑理论的选择难题”两个层次为逻辑学的伦理向度建构相应的论证。这些论证以及对相关异议的回应,可以激发当代哲学家重新思考逻辑学的规范性难题之症结。

In his 1903 Harvard Lectures,C.S.Peirce sets forth that reasoning is a kind of controlledactivity and logic as a science of human reasoning has an ethical dimension.This thesis not only plays a pivotalrole in Peirce’s own version of pragmatism,but also inspires philosophers today to rethink the nature of logic.Borrowing from Peirce’s work and new resources in contemporary philosophy of logic,at least two argumentsfor the dependence of logic on ethics can be reconstructed:one from the perspective of“the subject matter of logic”,the other from“the problem of choice in theories of logic”.These arguments,with reasonable responsesto possible objections,can shed light on the crux of the normativity problem in contemporary philosophy of logic.