集体意向性是生物原初的吗? ——兼评托马塞洛的共享意向性理论对塞尔的辩护

Is Collective Intentionality Biological Primitive?Comments on Tomasello’s Shared Intentionality Rheory Defense for Searle

约翰·塞尔的集体意向性理论中有一个令人费解的论断:集体意向性是一种生物学上的原初现象。这一论断涵盖了三个关键性命题:不可还原命题、原初性命题和生物起源命题,塞尔对这些命题的论证均缺乏可靠的依据。近年来,不少集体意向性理论的支持者试图结合进化生物学,尤其是托马塞洛等人对共享意向性的个体发生学研究来支持和推进塞尔的这一主张。但事实上,进化生物学对合作和利他主义行为的心理学解释存在多种解释机制,这些机制并非都指向集体意向性。虽然托马塞洛将共享意向性视为合作和利他主义的基础,但他认为作为自然倾向的共享意向性仅存在于个体发育初期,如果没有互惠利他的作用机制,这种自然倾向无法持续,因此,托马塞洛的相关研究难以为塞尔的论断提供有力的支撑。

There is a somewhat puzzling statement in John Searle’s theory of collective intentionality:“collective intentionality is a biologically primitive phenomenon”.This statement covers three critical theses:irreducibility thesis,primitiveness thesis,biological origin thesis.Searle’s arguments for these theses lack reliable basis.Many scholars proposed that Michael Tomasello’s research in the ontogeny of shared intentionality could confirm Searle’s statement from the perspective of evolutionary biology in recent years.However,in fact,there are many explanation mechanisms for cooperation and altruism in evolutionary biology,and most of thesemechanisms don’t point at collective intentionality.Although Tomasello regards shared intentionality as thebasis of cooperation and altruism,his understanding of shared intentionality is completely different from Searle’s.Shared intentionality,as a natural predisposition,only exists in the early stage of individual development.Therefore,Tomasello’s relevant research can’t provide strong support for Searle’s statement at all.