职能部门间的纵向互动策略及其选择逻辑——基于A市市场监管综合执法部门的模糊集定性比较分析

Vertical Interaction Strategy between Functional Departments and Its Selection Logic——Based on Market Regulatory Enforcement Agency in City A through fs-QCA

纵向政府间关系是中国政府研究的一个重要领域。已有研究对纵向政府间的互动进行了深入的案例呈现,但缺乏对职能部门间纵向互动的聚焦和多案例的归纳总结。从理性选择理论出发,本文构建了一个职能部门间的纵向策略互动分析,采用模糊集定性比较分析的方法对54个职能部门纵向策略互动的具体案例展开研究,探讨上级部门的策略选择逻辑。研究发现,在压力任务型和责任驱动型的情境下,上级部门倾向于使用非正式行为;交办履职型和利益耦合型的情境下,上级部门倾向于使用正式行为。总的来说,职能部门间的纵向策略互动依然在维护正式权威的前提下进行,压力等因素催生非正式行为的出现。区别于纵向政府间的上下领导关系,本文对基于业务指导关系的职能部门纵向互动进行了更深入的研究,丰富了对中国政府间纵向关系的理解。

Vertical intergovernmental relations represent an important field of Chinese government research.There have been in-depth case studies on the interaction between vertical governments,but there is a lack of focus on the vertical interaction between functional departments,together with the lack of conclusions based on multiple case studies.Starting from the rational choice theory,this paper constructs a vertical strategic interaction process between functional departments,uses the qualitative comparative analysis method of fuzzy sets to study the 54 cases of vertical strategic interaction between vertical departments,and discusses the strategic choice logic of superior departments.The study found that in the emergency and responsibility-driven situations,the superior departments tend to use informal behavior;in the context of performing duties according to regulations and coupling interests,the superior departments tend to use formal behavior.In general,the vertical strategic interaction between functional departments is still carried out under the premise of maintaining formal authority,and factors such as pressure promote the emergence of informal behavior.Different from the leadership relationship between vertical governments,the research on the vertical interaction of functional departments based on the professional guidance relationship has enriched the understanding of the vertical relationship between Chinese governments.