个人信息保护的市场机制与法律监管的福利效果

The Market Mechanism for Protecting Consumer Information and the Welfare Effects of Legal Arrangement

本文基于一个二维Hotelling模型,分析个人信息保护的市场机制和法律规制的福利效果。研究表明,消费者隐私成本相对较低时,企业会补贴消费者以获取更多数据,而当隐私成本相对较高时,均衡转为非价格竞争主导,企业主动向消费者提供个人信息保护服务;强制企业无条件保护消费者个人信息的法律安排可能降低消费者剩余和社会福利;相对严苛的“单独同意”法律条款虽然会增加保护消费者数据的厂商个数及其市场份额,但最终可能损害消费者福利。

In a two-dimensional Hotelling model,we attempt to analyze the market mechanism and the impacts of legal intervention on consumer surplus and social welfare.The results show that,first,if the privacy costs to consumers are relatively low,firms in equilibrium will provide price discount to attract consumers so as to gather and utilize consumer data,while if the privacy costs are relatively high,firms then switch to non-price competition by protecting consumer data but raising product prices.Second,un-conditionally prohibiting use of consumer data may either raise or lower consumer surplus/social welfare,because of the lost data value to society.Third,the relatively strict"individual consent"condition under the new law may in fact hurt consumers,as firms are able to pass on the marginal compliance costs to consumers.