中小股东监督与漂绿治理——基于词向量模型的文本分析

Minority shareholder supervision and greenwashing governance:an analysis based on the word embedding model

企业漂绿作为一种具有误导性的环境信息披露,扭曲了真实的绿色信号,加深了企业与外部利益相关者之间信息不对称的程度。该研究采用了机器学习中较为先进的词向量技术对中国上市公司环保文本中的漂绿程度进行了测度,并讨论了中小股东监督对漂绿行为的治理效应。研究发现:中小股东的监督有助于抑制企业的漂绿行为,并且这一效应在经过了PSM模型、Heckman检验、2SLS模型以及针对漂绿指标的敏感性测试等多项稳健性检验后依然成立。在进一步的机制检验和分析中获得如下发现:①在信息不对称程度较高的企业里,中小股东对漂绿的抑制效应更加明显。这说明降低企业与外部的信息不对称是中小股东抑制漂绿行为的重要机制。②在针对具体机制的检验中,研究发现中小股东的监督效果有赖于大股东对管理层的控制能力。在大股东控制力较强的公司里,中小股东的监督效果较好;而在管理层话语权较强的公司里,中小股东的监督效果较弱。③从中小股东的局限性看,研究发现中小股东有较为明显的专业局限性,这表现在具有较高环保专业性的公司里,以及在受到较多专业分析师关注的公司里,中小股东的监督效果都较弱。此外,研究还发现中小股东较为明显的短视局限,具体表现为在股价表现较好的公司里,中小股东的监督动机受到了明显的抑制。④最后,该研究进一步检验了中小股东监督的实质性效果。研究发现中小股东的监督促进了企业增加环保费用,但对环保投资和绿色创新的影响并不明显。该研究将中小股东监督与漂绿联系在一起,拓展了对漂绿治理机理的认识,研究结论具有一定的政策意义:一方面,中小股东本身的禀赋特征有利于其察觉企业的漂绿行为,因此鼓励中小股东积极参与监督治理,有利于营造良好的绿色披露环境。另一方面,也应该注意到,中小股东的监督有明显的局限性,在鼓励中小股东监督的同时,还是应该大力发展专业的第三方环保监督、认证机构,积极推进包括环境审计在内的专业环境监督。

Greenwashing as a misleading practice of environmental information disclosure distorts the true‘green’signal and deepens the information asymmetry between firms and external stakeholders.This research used advanced word embedding model in machine learning to measure the degree of greenwashing in the environmental texts of listed companies in China and discussed the governance effect of minority shareholder supervision on greenwashing behavior.The study found that minority shareholder supervision could help curb firms’greenwashing behavior,and this effect still held after a number of robustness tests,such as the 2SLS model,the PSM model,the Heckman test,and sensitivity tests for greenwashing indicators.Further analysis led to the following findings:①In firms with a high degree of information asymmetry,the inhibitory effect of minority shareholders on greenwashing was more pronounced.This indicated that reducing the information asymmetry between firms and external parties was an important mechanism for minority shareholders to inhibit greenwashing behavior.②In the specific mechanism testing,the study found that the supervisory effect of minority shareholders depended on the controlling power of major shareholders over management.In firms where the controlling power of major shareholders was strong,the supervisory effect of minority shareholders was better,while in firms where management was stronger,the supervisory effect of minority shareholders was weaker.③From the perspective of the limitations of minority shareholders,this study found that minority shareholders had obvious professional limitations.It was revealed that in firms with high environmental professionalism and receiving more attention from professional analysts,the supervisory effect of minority shareholders was relatively weak.In addition,the research also found that minority shareholders had obvious short-sighted limitations,specifically manifested in firms with good stock performance,where the supervisory motivation of minority shareholders was significantly suppressed.④Finally,this article further examined the substantive effects of minority shareholder supervision and found that this supervision promoted enterprises to increase their environmental protection expenses,but its impact on environmental investment and innovation was not significant.This article links minority shareholder supervision to greenwashing and expands our understanding of the mechanisms behind green governance.The research findings have certain policy implications.On the one hand,the characteristics of minority shareholders themselves make it easier for them to perceive a firm’s greenwashing behavior.Therefore,encouraging them to actively participate in supervising governance is beneficial for creating a good environment for green disclosure.On the other hand,it should also be noted that the supervision of minority shareholders has significant limitations.Therefore,while encouraging minority shareholder supervision,it is still necessary to vigorously develop professional third-party environmental monitoring,certification organizations,and environmental audits.