地方灾情报送与上级信息核查的信号博弈模型

Signalling game model for disaster reporting and superior inspection

灾情快速上报和精准核查是开展救灾工作的前提,但由于上级政府在核查过程中受制于人员专业水平,设备检测能力和核查限期等因素,导致地方政府灾情报送信息失真.假设上级政府对于自身核查能力具有私人信息,将公布的核查策略作为信号,灾区地方政府根据观察到的核查信号决定是否准确报送灾情,建立了两级政府间灾情核查的多阶段信号博弈模型,得出贝叶斯纳什均衡解.研究结果表明:地方政府的灾情报送行为受到预期成本、收益,以及上级政府的核查能力等因素影响.在一定信号成本范围内,上级政府采取选择弱核查策略,发布强核查信号的“释放高压强信号”策略可以在降低工作成本的同时迫使地方政府实报灾情.在多阶段模型中,当地方政府的贴现率较大时,上级政府采取“先强后弱”的核查策略更有利于督促地方政府实报灾情.

Immediate disaster reporting and accurate verification are the prerequisites of disaster relief.In the process of major emergency disaster verification,the superior government is restricted by the professional level of personnel,testing equipment and verification time,so that some local governments intentionally take actions to profit this opportunity.Assuming the superior government having private information about its own verifica-tion ability and making the published verification strategy as a signal,a multi-stage signal game model for dis-aster verification between the two-levels of governments is established where the local government decides its submission strategy according to the signal.Bayesian Nash equilibrium is solved.The results show that disas-ter reporting strategy of local governments is affected by the expected benefits,the costs,and the superior gov-ernment's verification ability.When the signal cost is low enough,the“releasing high intensity signal”strat-egy of the superior government,i.e.,choosing weak verification strategy and issuing strong verification signal,can reduce the cost of verification and force the local government to report truthfully.In the multi-period mod-el,when the discount rate of local government is large enough,the superior government's verification strategy of first strengthening and then weakening is more conducive to reducing the local government's concealment and misrepresentation.