政策不确定性下黄河流域污染协同治理的动态调整与实现路径

Dynamic Adjustment and Realization Path of Coordinated Pollution Control in the Yellow River Basin Under Policy Uncertainty

污染治理是实现黄河流域高质量发展的重要手段,而中央政府政策调整下各有限理性参与主体之间动态博弈导致的政策不确定性是理解黄河流域污染现象的关键因素。为此,基于有限理性假设,结合前景理论,构建央-地-企三方演化博弈模型,探讨政策不确定性下黄河流域污染协同治理的有效政策工具,并通过仿真分析了各个参数对污染协同治理演化的方向和速度的影响。结果显示:(1)提升博弈主体不合作行动的感知损失、降低不合作行动的感知收益是推动系统达到最优均衡点的有效途径;(2)提高博弈主体不合作行动的认知程度,增强博弈主体风险意识可以有效抑制环境污染;(3)提高地方政府协同治理质量和中央督察质量可以有效抑制企业的不严格排放行为;(4)生态绩效考核是中国环境质量提升的重要机制,但必须以完善的甄别机制和足够的奖励力度为前提。

Pollution control is an important means to achieve high-quality development of the Yellow River basin,and the policy uncertainty caused by the dynamic game among the limited rational participants under the central government's policy adjustment is the key factor to understand the pollution phenomenon in the Yellow River basin.This paper combines evolutionary game theory with prospect theory,constructs an evolutionary game model among of the central government,local government and polluting enterprises,and explores the effective policy tools for coordinated pollution control in the Yellow River basin under policy uncertainty,and analyze the influence of various parameters on the direction and speed of the evolution of collaborative pollution control.The results indicate that:(1)Intensifying the participants’perceived value of uncooperative action strategy,and reducing the the participants’perceived value of cooperative action strategy are a effective way for the system to converge to the optimal evolutionary;(2)The problem of pollution control can be effectively mitigated by improving the cognition degree of local government and polluting enterprises on uncooperative action risk;(3)Improving the awareness of the consequences of local governments and enterprises choosing“weak”actions and enhancing the risk awareness of game players can effectively curb environmental pollution;(4)Under Chinese decentralization,ecological performance appraisal is an important mechanism for improving China’s environmental quality,but it must be based on a perfect screening mechanism and sufficient incentives.