员工福利、融资约束与现金持有——基于中国资本市场的经验证据

Employee Benefits,Financing Constraints and Cash Holdings——Empirical Evidence Based on China's Capital Market

从公司内部治理中的代理成本动机角度出发,以我国沪深两市上市公司2013-2021年的数据为研究对象,实证研究员工福利水平对企业现金持有的财务决策行为影响。研究发现:在我国新兴资本市场经济下,代表公司内部治理机制的员工福利与企业现金持有量存在负向关系,支持公司治理机制的代理成本动机。考虑融资约束的中介作用,通过“三步法”原则检验发现员工福利对融资约束具有抑制作用,融资约束在员工福利水平与现金持有的负相关关系中发挥部分中介作用。考虑企业所有权性质差异与行业竞争强度等因素的影响,发现非国有企业和行业竞争强度较大的企业员工福利与现金持有量的负相关关系更为突出,依然证明代理成本动机的存在。

From the perspective of agency cost motivation in corporate internal governance,this paper takes the data of listed companies in my country's Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2013 to 2021 as the research object,and empirically studies the impact of employee welfare levels on the financial decision-making behavior of corporate cash holdings.The research finds that:in my country's emerging capital market economy,employee benefits,which represent the company's internal governance mechanism,have a negative relationship with corporate cash holdings,which supports the agency cost motive of corporate governance mechanism.Considering the intermediary role of financing constraints,through the"three-step method"principle test,it is found that employee benefits have an inhibitory effect on financing constraints,and financing constraints play a partial intermediary role in the negative correlation between employee welfare levels and cash holdings.Considering the influence of factors such as differences in the nature of enterprise ownership and the intensity of industry competition,it is found that the negative correlation between employee welfare and cash holdings in non-stateowned enterprises and enterprises with strong industry competition is more prominent,which still proves the existence of agency cost motives.