基于零售商公平偏好的联合碳减排与低碳宣传微分对策研究

Differential Game on Joint Carbon Emission Reduction and Low-carbon Promotion with Considering Retailer’s Fairness Preference in Supply Chains

在低碳经济下,零售商的促销和公平偏好会影响制造商的决策,同时考虑到碳减排的多周期性和动态性,引入时间因素,把零售商的促销和公平偏好引入到供应链减排的微分博弈模型中,构建了一个由制造商和具有公平偏好的零售商组成的供应链减排微分博弈模型,比较分析了分散决策和集中决策两种情况下的供应链的最佳策略。研究发现,随着时间的变化,产品的碳减排量逐步上升,但是上升的速度越来越慢,并且逐步趋于稳定;同时还发现,零售商的公平偏好存在一临界点,当零售商的公平偏好小于该值时,集中决策时零售商的促销努力程度大于分散决策;当零售商的公平偏好大于该值时,分散决策时零售商的促销努力程度大于集中决策。本文所得结论可以为制造商和零售商的决策提供理论依据。

With the excessive consumption of energy,abnormal climate and environmental pollution becoming increasingly prominent,countries all over the world began to advocate low-carbon economy,which is the general trend of world economic development.Under the constraints of relevant laws and regulations,more and more enterprises gradually realize the importance of reducing carbon emissions and begin to improve the produce technics and produce low-carbon products.At the same time,with the deepening of low-carbon awareness,consumers with low-carbon awareness gradually tend to buy low-carbon products.The higher the emission reduction of products,the greater the market demand.However,the carbon emission reduction of products still needs to be transmitted to consumers through the low-carbon promotion of retailers,which shows that on the one hand,product emission reduction needs to rely on the emission reduction efforts of manufacturers,On the other hand,retailers'promotion of low-carbon products is also of great significance.Therefore,it is very important to study product emission reduction and low-carbon promotion from the perspective of supply chain.