考虑广告努力和信号博弈的双渠道供应链均衡策略

Dual-Channel Supply Chain Equilibrium Strategy Considering Advertising Effort and Signal Game

本文构建了由制造商和零售商组成的两级供应链信号博弈模型。考虑信息对称和不对称情况,分别讨论制造商建立直销渠道和无直销渠道下制造商和零售商之间的策略性竞争博弈问题,分析制造商建立直销渠道和信息结构对供应链成员决策和收益的影响。研究发现:制造商建立直销渠道会促使其在广告上投入更多的资金,信息结构不影响制造商的广告努力投入。无直销渠道时,制造商的收益不受信息结构的影响,信息优势使H类型零售商受益,而对L类型零售商造成不利影响。双渠道销售时,若制造商的直销成本较小,制造商可能更愿意保留信息劣势。当直销成本较大时,H类型零售商受益于信息优势;当直销成本较小时,L类型零售商受益于信息优势。

A two-level supply chain signaling game model composed of a manufacturer and a retailer was constructed.Considering the situations of information symmetry and asymmetry,the strategic competition game between the manufacturer and the retailer under the direct selling channel established by the manufacturer and the non-direct selling channel was discussed.The influence of the manufacturer's establishment of direct selling channel and information structure on the decision-making of the supply chain members was analyzed.The results show that the establishment of direct selling channels by manufacturers will encourage them to invest more in advertising.The information structure does not affect the manufacturer's advertising efforts.When there is no direct selling channel,the manufacturer's revenue is not affected by the information structure,H-type retailers benefit from information advantages,and L-type retailers are adversely affected.In dual-channel selling,when the manufacturer's direct sales costs are lower,the manufacturer may be more willing to retain the information disadvantage.When the direct selling cost is large,the H-type retailer benefits from the information advantage.When the direct selling cost is high,the L-type retailer benefits from the information advantage.