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垄断行为引入刑事责任:威慑与谦抑 被引量:2

Criminal Liability of Monopoly Behavior:Deterrence and Restraint
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摘要 引入刑事威慑是反垄断法有效运行的内在要求。从补充威慑的角度,我国《反垄断法》应当对卡特尔行为引入刑事责任。在刑事责任的实施上,有必要确立垄断案件行政执法的先行处理,并同时构建行刑衔接机制,落实刑罚的实施谦抑。在刑事司法环节引入合规激励机制不仅有利于实现刑罚的恰当威慑,更能最大程度地激励企业主动建立合规体系,从根本上维护公平竞争的市场环境。 Criminal deterrence is an inherent requirement for the effective operation of antitrust laws.From a supplementary deterrence perspective,China's Anti-Monopoly Law should incorporate criminal liability for cartel behavior.In the implementation of criminal responsibility,it is necessary to clearly prioritize administrative enforcement in monopoly cases and establish a linkage mechanism between administrative enforcement and criminal justice procedure to ensure the restrained implementation of criminal penalties.In addition,introducing a compliance incentive mechanism in the criminal justice procedure not only facilitates achieving the realistic and appropriate deterrence but also maximally motivates companies to proactively establish compliance systems and fundamentally maintain a market environment of fair competition.
作者 魏艳 Wei Yan
机构地区 上海大学法学院
出处 《竞争政策研究》 CSSCI 2023年第4期12-24,共13页 Competition Policy Research
基金 上海市高水平地方高校创新团队项目“国际经贸规则重构下上海高水平对外开放的法治保障”的阶段性成果。
关键词 反垄断法 垄断行为 刑事责任 威慑 谦抑 Anti-monopoly Law Monopoly Behavior Criminal Liability Deterrence Restraint
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