耕地保护财政转移支付制度体系重构——以浙江省新增建设用地使用费为例

A new fiscal transfer payment system for cultivated land protection:Taking the fees for newly increased construction land in Zhejiang province as an example

耕地保护财政转移支付制度是缓和耕地保护与经济发展矛盾的有效手段。以浙江省新增建设用地使用费为例,遵循财事权相匹配原则重构耕地保护财政转移支付制度体系,对于提高财政资金利用效率、促进耕地资源保护具有重要意义。结果表明:总体上,浙江省在全国31个省级行政单位中处于耕地亏损状态,不能参与中央财政转移支付资金分配;省域范围内,全省64个研究单元中共有50个县级行政单位存在耕地保护地方事权外溢效应,可以分配到浙江省省以下财政转移支付资金。在此基础上,进一步对比分析财事权相匹配视角下的优化分配结果与实际分配结果。研究发现,相比实际分配模式,基于财事权相匹配视角构建的财政转移支付体系下资金分配对耕地保护任务重的地区倾斜度更强。

The fiscal transfer payment system for cultivated land protection could realize the balance between cultivated land protection and economic development by compensating the relevant stakeholders with restricted development due to their responsibility for cultivated land protection.Taking the fees for newly increased construction land in Zhejiang province as an example,we construct a new fiscal transfer payment system for cultivated land protection on the basis of the principle of matching fiscal revenue and responsibility from the perspective of local government,which is of great significance for improving the efficiency of fiscal fund utilization and promoting the protection of cultivated land resources.The results show that Zhejiang is in deficit of cultivated land among 31 provincial-level regions nationwide generally,and cannot participate in the distribution of fiscal transfer payment funds from the central government.Within the provincial scope,there are 50 county-level administrative units such as the main urban area of Jiaxing,Zhuji city,and Shangyu district,etc.,which have spillover of cultivated land protection responsibility and can be compensated by fiscal funds distribution in 64 research units in Zhejiang.Among which,the main urban area of Jiaxing has the highest spillover level and the corresponding distribution is up to 76.87 million yuan.Meanwhile,14 research units without spillover cannot participate in the distribution of fiscal transfer payment funds from the province,which includes the main urban area of Hangzhou,the main urban area of Wenzhou,Xiaoshan district,and Yiwu city,etc.Moreover,the optimal distribution on the basis of the principle of matching fiscal revenue and responsibility is compared with that in practice.It is found that the funds distribution of the new fiscal transfer payment system has a stronger inclination to the regions with heavy cultivated land protection tasks.The regression results show that,the coefficient under the optimal distribution model is higher than that in practice.The study is of great significance to further improve the fiscal management system of China especially below the provincial level,and to make full use of the fiscal incentive and restraint mechanism to achieve the goal of cultivated land protection.