康德式自由:人类学的而非形而上学的

Kantian Freedom:Anthropological not Metaphysical

自然与自由之间的张力是康德哲学乃至整个近代西方哲学中的一大主题。康德提出了一种作为“世界知识”的实践人类学构想,在该构想中,自由不是处于本体界当中的先验主体的特有性状,而是生活在自然世界中的人所应达到的道德理想。与康德更为人们所熟知的形而上学的自由理论相比,人类学中关于自由与自然之间关系的解说在终极旨归上是一致的,但却避免了前者当中包含的诸多困难。因此,人类学中对自由的解说更好地体现了康德自由观的真正意义和持久价值。

In Kant's pragmatic or practical anthropology,which is conceived as a sort of"knowledge of the world",freedom refers not so much to a property pertaining to the transcendental subject within the noumenal world as to a moral ideal for human beings living in the natural world.While this conception of freedom shares the same concerns with Kant's more famous metaphysical theory of freedom,the former proposes a non-metaphysical account of the relationship between freedom and nature and is saved from many serious difficulties inherent in the latter.As a less problematic and more promising version,the anthropological account better represents the true meaning and enduring significance of Kant's conception of freedom.